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Chapter 5

Antitrust Pri nci pies
Affecting Franchise Law*

Antitrust law in the United States intersects with franchise law in a number of complex
ways. Falling afoul of antitrust law can be costly-antitrust violations give rise to treble
damages and, in the extreme, even criminal penalties. Further, the antitrust principles
governing franchise relationships are in a state of transition. The upshot is that careful
attention to emerging antitrust norms is critical for students of franchise law.
Antitrust law has a rich and varied history, and its principles have changed
considerably over time. This chapter will be concerned primarily with antitrust law
as it stands today. Today, antitrust law is generally understood as a mechanism for
promoting industrial competition for the benefit of consumers. The Supreme Court
has described the Sherman Act (the first and most general of the antitrust statutes) as
a "consumer welfare prescription." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
The Court has also made clear that antitrust law is not concerned with protecting
individual businesses (or franchisees) against immoral or unethical business conduct,
noting that "[e]ven an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another
does not, without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws." Brooke Group,
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,225 (1993). Unless a plaintiff
can describe the defendant's conduct as injurious to economic rivalry in a way that
harms consumers, she probably does not have an antitrust claim.
The kinds of economic distortions that can cause harm to consumers fall into
three broad categories, which are regulated by various antitrust statutes. First, agreements in restraint of trade are prohibited most generally in Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, which condemns " [e ]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ***." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). A classic
example of an unlawful restraint of trade is a price-fixing cartel, which is per se illegal
and would be criminally prosecuted. But there are other, less obviously anticompetitive agreements in restraint of trade that are judged not under a rule of per se illegality
but rather under a "rule of reason." As we shall see, most antitrust issues in franchising
relationships fall under this rule of reason.
• By Daniel A. Crane
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A second category of unlawful activity consists of exclusionary acts that lead to or
exploit monopoly power. The basic statute here is Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which
prohibits monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, or combining or conspiring to
monopolize. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Other statutes that contain more specific provisions
prohibiting various forms of exclusionary conduct include the Clayton Act and the
Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibit various forms of tying, exclusive dealing, and
price discrimination.
A third broad category consists of mergers or asset acquisitions that result in market dominance. Such mergers are prohibited by Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Merger
law raises relatively few questions of direct relevance to franchise law and will not be
considered in this chapter.
These three broad categories of conduct often overlap. At their core, all three of
the paradigmatic evils involve conduct that facilitates the acquisition or enhancement
of market power and does so without a sufficient efficiency justification. Particularly
in the franchising context, it is not always clear how a particular practice should be
categorized for legal purposes-for example, is the grant of an exclusive territory to
a franchisee by a franchisor harmful to competition because it excludes rivals at the
retail level (and hence creates a retail monopoly) or because it reflects an effort by the
franchisor to stabilize a price-fixing agreement at the manufacturer level (and hence
facilitates an illegal cartel)? 1
Rather than approaching antitrust-franchising intersection issues from a statutory
perspective, this chapter approaches them from an economic organizational perspective. An important juxtaposition in antitrust is between vertical practices and horizontal practices. A vertical practice is one that concerns the relationship between firms that
have a business relationship other than that of competitor. The relationship between a
franchisor and a franchisee is a vertical relationship since the two firms operate at different levels in the chain of production and distribution (although note that in a "dual
distribution" situation, where the franchisor owns some of its own retail operations, the
relationship may be both horizontal and vertical, which creates some special antitrust
problems). The relationship between two franchisees is horizontal, since the two firms
operate at the same level of production or distribution and may be competitors.
Most antitrust issues that arise in franchising situations involve vertical restraints.
Often, these restraints take the form of controls by the franchisor over the franchisee-for example contractual controls on the prices the franchisee may charge at retail
1. A manufacturer's cartel might want to reduce the number of retailers in order
to reduce "cheating'' by members of the cartel. One of a cartel's major challenges is to
police cheating by its members, since each member has an incentive to cut price slightly
off the monopoly price set by the cartel. If the cartelists are manufacturers whose goods
are distributed through retailers, they may find it difficult to monitor compliance with the
price-fixing agreement, since the only prices that show up publicly are retail prices set by
the retailers. Exclusive retail agreements ensure that there is only one price per brand in
any given geographic area, which simplifies the task of monitoring prices.
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or requirements that the franchisee purchase all of its nonperishable supplies from the
franchisor. Sometimes, however, the vertical restraint may be instigated by a franchisee unhappy with the behavior of its fellow franchisees. In such cases, determining
whether the restraint at issue is vertical or horizontal may have important legal implications. As you read the remainder of this chapter and consider antitrust treatment of
various common franchising practices, consider whether each practice is vertical or
horizontal and whether or to what extent regulation of the practice furthers antitrust's
consumer welfare objective.

I.

Per Se Rule, Rule of Reason, and Exclusionary
Conduct Basics

In this section, we briefly introduce three key analytical categories in antitrust. The
first two, the per se rule and the rule of reason, apply to claims concerning contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies in "restraint of trade," which are prohibited by Section
I of the Sherman Act. Rule of reason and per se are thus alternative modes of analysis addressed to different competitive practices covered by a single statute. The third
category, monopolization (or, more generally, exclusionary conduct) enjoys its own
statutory category-Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Note that the same conduct can
sometimes be a violation of both Section I and Section 2.

A.

The Per Se Rule

In its earliest antitrust cases, the Supreme Court seemed to hold that the language
of Section I prohibiting "every" contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade was to be taken literally and that every such contract was flatly illegal. Over time,
the impossibility of such a rule became apparent (imagine a law firm whose partners
were forbidden to agree with one another on their hourly rate to clients). Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court has continued to hold that, as to certain categories of restraint
of trade, the flat prohibition continues: "[T]here are certain agreements or practices
which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for
their use." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958).
Note that the justification for the per se rule is not that every restraint that falls
within the category will always be harmful. For example, it is possible that a price-fixing
cartel could be beneficial under certain circumstances if it helped the members of the
cartel better to predict how much output they would need to produce in the next year
and, hence, to operate more efficiently. The justification for the per se approach is probabilistic: certain categories of conduct are so unlikely to have redeeming qualities that
it simply is not worth entertaining arguments concerning their potential benefits. The
prohibitory rule, while perhaps occasionally overinclusive, nonetheless functions well.
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The categories of conduct that are prohibited per se are generally horizontal price
fixing (United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940)), market
division (Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990)), bid rigging (United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff d as modified, 175
U.S. 211 (1899)), and certain group boycotts (FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 428 (1990)). The Supreme Court has also intimated that certain
tying arrangements are per se illegal, although, as we shall shortly see, this intimation
is increasingly inaccurate.
It is relatively rare to see per se illegal offenses in a franchising relationship, since
most franchising contracts are vertical and (as of 2007) no purely vertical practices are
per se illegal. Nonetheless, it is still possible for franchising entities to commit per se
offenses. For example, it might be per se illegal if a group of franchisors agreed on the
terms of their franchise contracts. It also might be per se illegal if two or more potential franchisees colluded to increase their power in negotiating franchise contracts. In
an omitted portion of the Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins opinion we present below in the
tying context, the court rejected the claim that a franchisor that operated some of its
own units was engaging in illegal market division.

B.

The Rule of Reason

The rule of reason governs all agreements in restraint of trade that do not fall within
the categories specified in the per se rule. The classic articulation of the rule of reason
is the following statement from Justice Brandeis's decision in the Chicago Board of
Trade decision:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppres~ or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts.

Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918).
As the Chicago Board of Trade formulation suggests, rule of reason analysis is
often highly fact-intensive and technical. In more modern parlance, this analysis
usually requires the plaintiff to define a relevant market and prove that the challenged
restraint of trade enhances market power in the relevant market. Even if this showing
is met, the defendant can typically rebut it by proving that the restraint enhances efficiency in some way. The plaintiff is then typically allowed a rebuttal-the opportunity
to show that the efficiencies produced by the restraint could have been achieved in a
manner less restrictive of competition (although note that most courts do not require
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the defendant to have restricted competition in the "least restrictive" way, as that test
is used in strict scrutiny analysis in constitutional law).
Courts have also suggested the possibility of a "Quick Look" analysis-a form of
analysis neither as lengthy as full rule of reason nor as short as the per se approach.
See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993). The Supreme
Court has not ruled out the possibility of such an approach, suggesting instead that
as to all restraints that do not plainly fall within the per se rule the degree of scrutiny
will depend on the case: "[T]here is generally no categorical line to be drawn between
restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect
and those that call for more detailed treatment. What is required, rather, is an enquiry
meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint. The
object is to see whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or necessarily
will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction will
follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one." California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999).

C.

Monopolization and Other Exclusion

"The offense of monopoly under§ 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." United
States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S.563, 570-71 (1966). Both of these elements are often difficult to apply. Defining the relevant market-an absolute must for monopolization
and attempted monopolization cases-is a difficult, technical business. On the second
prong, there remains an active debate among courts and antitrust scholars today about
what it means "to monopolize." Since § 2 is not a status offense-it is not unlawful to
be a monopolist, merely to "monopolize" -there needs to be some distinction between
those activities that lead to monopoly but are allowed and those that are prohibited.
See U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (1945).
Although there is no exclusive catalogue of unlawful monopolizing activities, the
following kinds of conduct are illustrative: predatory pricing (pricing below cost in
order to drive out competitors), exclusive dealing or other anticompetitive contract
terms designed to block competitors, predatory product design (i.e., designing a new
biopsy gun so as to be incompatible with a competitor's biopsy needles), refusing to
share essential facilities, and obtaining patents by fraud.
In addition to pure monopolization, there are other kinds of conduct that
tend to block some competitors' access to particular clients and hence have some
market-power-enhancing effects but do not necessarily lead to monopoly. (Courts
sometimes use the phrases "monopoly" and "market power" interchangeably,
although it is probably best to think of monopoly power as a very strong form of
market power, such that one could unlawfully obtain market power without fully
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monopolizing). Thus, certain tying, exclusive dealing, and price discrimination practices could be thought of as enhancing market power (and hence perhaps violating
§ 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act even if not violating § 2 of the
Sherman Act).

II. lying Contracts
The Supreme Court has explained the offense of "tying" as follows:
[T)he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's
exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase
of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to
purchase elsewhere on different terms. When such forcing is present, competition on
the merits in the market for the tied item is restrained***. 'By conditioning his sale of
one commodity on the purchase of another, a seller coerces the abdication of buyers'
independent judgment as to the "tied" product's merits and insulates it from the competitive stresses of the open market:

Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-13 (1984) (quoting
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,605 (1953)).
Although different courts have classified its elements differently, it is fair to say
that a tying claim requires proof of at least the following: (1) that the defendant has
"tied" together two economically distinct products; (2) that the defendant has market
power in the "tying" market; and (3) that there is a demonstrable exclusionary impact
in the tied market.
For a period of time (and, indeed, possibly still today), the Supreme Court spoke
about tying arrangements that met those criteria as being per se illegal. However, it
is clear that whatever was meant by per se illegality in this context could not be what
was meant by per se illegality in the context of price fixing or other "naked" horizontal
arrangements condemned under § 1. Defining relevant markets, requiring proof of
market power, and looking for anticompetitive effects is not the stuff of the per se rule.
Part of the reason for the use of the per se terminology is that, for many years,
the Supreme Court held that market power in the tying market was conclusively
presumed if the tying firm had a patent or a copyright in that market. As we shall
see momentarily, this rule became particularly significant in the franchising context
when the Ninth Circuit held that trademarks also should be presumed to confer market power. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) Recently,
however, the Supreme Court has jettisoned its earlier precedent, holding that the
mere existence of a patent in the tying market does not allow any presumption as to
market power. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). If
not in patent, surely not in trademark either. Any remaining doubt as to this issue, as
reflected in the following opinions, should now be settled.
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KREHL v. BASKIN-ROBBINS ICE CREAM CO.
664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982)
ELY, Circuit Judge:
In this class action antitrust suit against Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Company
(BRICO) and its area franchisors,2 certain franchisees *** appeal from an order of
involuntary dismissal entered against them by the District Court. Because franchisees stipulated that Baskin-Robbins would be entitled to judgment absent proof of
a per se violation of the antitrust laws, we have no occasion to consider the lawfulness of the challenged business practices under the so-called "rule of reason." We
affirm.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

BRICO, the nation's largest chain of ice cream specialty stores, operates the
quintessential franchise system. See generally ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph
2, Vertical Restrictions Limiting Intrabrand Competition, 1-6 (1977). Originally a
small Southern California ice cream manufacturer, BRICO *** initially engaged in the
direct franchising of retail outlets in California. In 1959, BRICO began a program of
expansion through licensing independent manufacturers to produce Baskin-Robbins
ice cream and establish Baskin-Robbins franchised stores. This mode of expansion
was chosen because shortages of capital and personnel rendered any other method
impracticable. ***
At the second level of the system are the eight independent manufacturers
licensed by BRICO to operate as area franchisors. BRICO, again through a wholly
owned subsidiary, also operates at this level, acting as an area franchisor in six
exclusive territories. The independent area franchisors are contractually bound to
BRICO by Area Franchise Agreements. These agreements provide each area franchisor with an exclusive territory in which to manufacture Baskin-Robbins ice cream
products. They also authorize the area franchisors, in conjunction with BRICO,
to establish and service Baskin-Robbins franchised stores within their respective
territories. Under these agreements, the area franchisors are forbidden to disclose
the secret formulae and processes by which Baskin-Robbins ice cream products are
manufactured.

2. [1] For the sake of convenience, Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Company and its area
franchisors will be collectively referred to as "Baskin-Robbins:' When necessary to differentiate between them, the area franchisors will be referred to as such and Baskin-Robbins
Ice Cream Company will be referred to as "BRICO:'
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The third level of the Baskin-Robbins system is composed of the franchised store
owners. These independent businessmen are bound to both BRICO and the area franchisor by the standard form Store Franchise Agreement. Under these agreements, the
franchised store may sell only Baskin-Robbins ice cream products purchased from the
area franchisor in whose territory the store is located.
It is important to note that BRICO utilizes a "dual distribution" system. Under
this system, BRICO operates on two distinct levels of the distributional chain. As the
owner of the Baskin-Robbins trademarks and formulae, it licenses independent area
franchisors to manufacture Baskin-Robbins ice cream and establish franchised stores.
In this respect, BRICO's relationship to the area franchisors is vertical in nature.
BRICO also operates as an area franchisor, thereby assuming a horizontal position
relative to the other area franchisors.
BRICO provides extensive advertising and promotional support for both the area
franchisors and the store franchisees. As part of its services to the area franchisors,
BRICO sponsors quarterly Marketing, Organization, and Planning [MOAP] meetings. Attendance of these meetings is voluntary but, generally, a majority of the area
franchisors are represented. At these meetings, topics of current interest are discussed,
including marketing strategy, industry trends and costs. On occasion, informal discussions regarding wholesale and retail prices have taken place.
Certain franchisees of Baskin-Robbins bring this treble damage antitrust suit,
alleging three separate per se violations of s 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. s 1). First,
they contend that Baskin-Robbins ice cream products are unlawfully tied to the sale
of the Baskin-Robbins trademark. Second, they challenge the Baskin-Robbins "dual
distribution" system as an unlawful horizontal market allocation. Finally, franchisees
allege that BRICO and its area franchisors conspired to fix the wholesale prices of
Baskin-Robbins ice cream products.
At the close of franchisees' case in chief, Baskin-Robbins moved to dismiss the
action, pursuant to Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The District
Court, sitting without a jury, granted the motion, holding, inter alia, that: 1) The
tie-in claim failed because franchisees did not establish that the Baskin-Robbins
trademark was a separate product from Baskin-Robbins ice cream; 2) the horizontal
market allocation claim failed because franchisees did not establish the requisite concerted activity among competitors; and 3) the wholesale price fixing claim failed for
lack of proof of a purpose or effect to fix prices. This appeal, premised on 28 U.S.C.
s 1291, ensued.

II.

8.

ANALYSIS ***

The Tie-in Claim

It is well settled that there can be no unlawful tying arrangement absent proof that
there are, in fact, two separate products, the sale of one (i.e., the tying product) being
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conditioned upon the purchase of the other (i.e., the tied product). 3 Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613-14, 73 S. Ct. 872, 883, 97 L.Ed. 1277
(1953); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47 (9th Cir. 1971). Franchisees argue
that Baskin-Robbins' policy of conditioning the grant of a franchise upon the purchase
of ice cream exclusively from Baskin-Robbins constitutes an unlawful tying arrangement. According to franchisees, the tying product is the Baskin-Robbins trademark
and the tied product is the ice cream they are compelled to purchase. ***
The critical issue here is whether the Baskin-Robbins trademark may be properly
treated as an item separate from the ice cream it purportedly represents. We conclude,
as did the District Court, that it may not.
In support of their tie-in claim, franchisees rely heavily on Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971). They contend that Chicken Delight established, as
a matter of law, that a trademark is invariably a separate item whenever the product
it represents is distributed through a franchise system. A careful reading of Chicken
Delight, however, precludes such an interpretation and discloses that it stands only for
the unremarkable proposition that, under certain circumstances, a trademark may be
sufficiently unrelated to the alleged tied product to warrant treatment as a separate item.
In Chicken Delight, we were confronted with a situation where the franchisor
conditioned the grant of a franchise on the purchase of a catalogue of miscellaneous
items used in the franchised business. These products were neither manufactured by
the franchisor nor were they of a special design uniquely suited to the franchised business. Rather, they were commonplace paper products and packaging goods, readily
available in the competitive market place. In evaluating this arrangement, we stated
that, "in determining whether the (trademark) ... and the remaining ... items ...
are to be regarded as distinct items ... consideration must be given to the function of
trademarks." Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 48. Because the function of the trademark
in Chicken Delight was merely to identify a distinctive business format, we found the
nexus between the trademark and the tied products to be sufficiently remote to warrant treating them as separate products. 4 Id. at 48-49.
A determination of whether a trademark may appropriately be regarded as a separate product requires an inquiry into the relationship between the trademark and the
3. (8] Three additional elements must be proved to establish an unlawful tying
arrangement: 1) some modicum of coercion, Moore v. James H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d
1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 1977); 2) economic power in the tying product, Northern Pacific Railway Company v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6, 78 S.Ct. 514, 518, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958}; and
3) a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce must be affected, International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12, 92 L.Ed. 20 (1947}. Because we conclude that the
Baskin-Robbins trademark is not a separate product from Baskin-Robbins ice cream, we
do not consider whether these elements are present here.
4. (10] We express no opinion whether, in the proper case, a trademark may be so
closely linked to a component of the business format, to preclude a finding that the trademark
is a separate product. See Principle [sic] v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980).
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products allegedly tied to its sale. See id. at 48. In evaluating this relationship, consideration must be given to the type of franchising system involved. In Chicken Delight, we
distinguished between two kinds of franchising systems: 1) the business format system;
and 2) the distribution system. See id. at 49. 5 A business format franchise system is
usually created merely to conduct business under a common trade name. The franchise
outlet itself is generally responsible for the production and preparation of the system's
end product. The franchisor merely provides the trademark and, in some cases, supplies
used in operating the franchised outlet and producing the system's products. Under
such a system, there is generally only a remote connection between the trademark and
the products the franchisees are compelled to purchase. This is true because consumers
have no reason to associate with the trademark, those component goods used either in
the operation of the franchised store or in the manufacture of the end product. "Under
such a type of franchise, the trade-mark simply reflects the goodwill and quality standards of the enterprise it identifies. As long as ... franchisees (live) up to those quality
standards ... neither the protection afforded the trade-mark by law nor the value of the
trade-mark ... depends upon the source of the components." Id. at 48-49.
Where, as in Chicken Delight, the tied products are commonplace articles, the
franchisor can easily maintain its quality standards through other means less intrusive
upon competition.6 Accordingly, the coerced purchase of these items amounts to little
more than an effort to impede competition on the merits in the market for the tied
products.7 See Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6, 78 S.Ct. 514,
518, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958).
Where a distribution type system, such as that employed by Baskin-Robbins, is
involved, significantly different considerations are presented. See McCarthy, Trademark
Franchising and Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-ins, 58 Cal.L.Rev. 1085, 1108 (1970).
Under the distribution type system, the franchised outlets serve merely as conduits
through which the trademarked goods of the franchisor flow to the ultimate consumer.
These goods are generally manufactured by the franchisor or, as in the present case, by its

5. [11] Of course, a franchise system may be of the "distribution'' type in relation to
the end product of the system and of the "format" type in relation to the kinds of incidental
supplies tied to the sale of the trademark in Chicken Delight. The crucial inquiry is into the
relationship between the trademark and the product allegedly tied to its sale.
6. (12] Provision of specifications for the manufacture of these products is one means
often available to insure that franchisees maintain quality standards. See Chicken Delight,
448 F.2d at 51. Where, as here, the alleged tied product is manufactured pursuant to secret
formulae, the specification alternative is not available. See id. at n.9.
7. [13] In some cases, however, this coerced purchase may be justified as necessary
to prevent the sale of inferior goods under the franchisor's trademark. See Chicken Delight,
448 F.2d at 51; Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trade-Mark Licensing, 72
Yale L.J. 1171 (1963).
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licensees according to detailed specifications.8 In this context, the trademark serves a different function. Instead of identifying a business format, the trademark in a distribution
franchise system serves merely as a representation of the end product marketed by the
system. "It is to the system and the end product that the public looks with the confidence
that the established goodwill has created." Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 49 (emphasis
added). Consequently, sale of substandard products under the mark would dissipate
this goodwill and reduce the value of the trademark. The desirability of the trademark
is therefore utterly dependent upon the perceived quality of the product it represents.
Because the prohibition of tying arrangements is designed to strike solely at the use of
a dominant desired product to compel the purchase of a second undesired commodity,
id. at 47, the tie-in doctrine can have no application where the trademark serves only to
identify the alleged tied product. 9 The desirability of the trademark and the quality of the
product it represents are so inextricably interrelated in the mind of the consumer as to
preclude any finding that the trademark is a separate item for tie-in purposes.
In the case at bar, the District Court found that the Baskin-Robbins trademark merely
served to identify the ice cream products distributed by the franchise system. Based on
our review of the record, we cannot say that this finding is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err in ruling that the Baskin-Robbins
trademark lacked sufficient independent existence apart from the ice cream products
allegedly tied to its sale, to justify a finding of an unlawful tying arrangement. ***

TOMINAGA v. SHEPHERD
682 F. Supp. 1489 (C.D. Cal. 1988)
RAFEEDIE, District Judge. ***

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant El Centro is a California corporation and is the franchisor of "Pizza
Man-He Delivers" and "Chicken Delight" franchises in Los Angeles and Orange
Counties. There are currently forty-five Pizza Man, six combination Pizza Man and

8. [14] Franchisees argue that, because some Baskin-Robbins ice cream is manufactured by licensees instead of BRlCO, the trademark must be a separate product. We
reject this contention. Regardless of whether the ice cream is manufactured by BRlCO or
its licensees, the trademark still serves only to identify that distinctive ice cream made in
accordance with secret formulae and processes developed by BRICO.
9. [15] In this situation, it is simply impossible for the trademark to be desirable if
the product it represents is perceived as undesirable. Of course, franchisees may find the
purchase of Baskin-Robbins ice cream undesirable because it prevents them from selling a
less expensive brand of ice cream under the Baskin-Robbins trademark. The antitrust laws,
however, are not designed to facilitate such a fraud upon the consumer.
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Chicken Delight, and one Chicken Delight franchisees in the Southern California area.
Defendant Vance Shepherd is the president of El Centro. El Centro has registered
its Pizza Man and Chicken Delight service marks with the United States Patent and
Trademark office.
Plaintiff Milton Tominaga does business as P.M. Distributors in the Los Angeles
area, and is a wholesale distributor of ingredients for prepared foods and restaurant
supplies. He is an authorized distributor of food and packaging products to El Centro's franchisees. Tominaga owned a franchised store from 1975 until 1985. From
1982 to the present, he supplied various Pizza Man franchises with ingredients and
supplies. In 1985, Tominaga sold his Pizza Man store, according to his affidavit,
because defendant Shepherd told him he would become the exclusive distributor for
Pizza Man ingredients and supplies.
El Centro franchisees entered into a franchise agreement with El Centro in order
to obtain licenses to operate Pizza Man stores (all facts pertaining to Pizza Man should
be assumed to apply to Chicken Delight unless otherwise noted) and to utilize the
service mark. Under the franchise agreement, a franchisee is not limited to purchasing
its food products and supplies from any one distributor:
a franchisee may purchase any and all authorized food products and packaging from
suppliers of his choice, provided that such food and packaging are uniform and high
quality and comply with the standards and specifications set forth in the Operations
Manual.
Also, under the standard form franchise agreements, each El Centro franchisee is obligated to package all goods sold to the public in approved Pizza Man packaging unless
such packaging is unavailable, in which case written permission must be obtained
from El Centro. Each franchisee is further required to prepare its menu and use ingredients in accordance with the methods and specifications set forth in the Pizza Man
Operations Manual.
Tominaga was an authorized distributor of packaging materials and refrigerated
food products, however, Tominaga was never the exclusive Pizza Man distributor
(although Tominaga states that he was promised an exclusive dealership). There are
substantial factual disputes as to Tominaga's performance as a distributor, and the
circumstances surrounding El Centro's entry into the market for the [sic] distributing
packaging products to franchisees.
El Centro claims that Tominaga's conduct as a distributor of poor quality merchandise damaged its goodwill, as embodied in the service marks. Defendants have
provided evidence that Tominaga provided substandard food and packaging products
which did not meet El Centro's quality standards, and that he overcharged the franchisees. El Centro claims to have provided Tominaga with notice of its dissatisfaction
on numerous occasions.
Tominaga disputes El Centro's charges, and claims that Vance Shepherd was
angry with Tominaga when Tominaga refused to provide El Centro with a "kick back"
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from the manufacturers. When Shepherd offered to buy Tominaga out, Tominaga
refused, and was allegedly threatened by Shepherd ("I'll break your back").
El Centro, on the other hand, argues that all its actions were based upon a perceived business need to standardize its distribution system and the quality of products
delivered to the franchisees. This was the basis for El Centro's decision to enter into
the distribution business, and its offer to buy out Tominaga.
In November of 1986, El Centro notified some ofTominaga's suppliers, as well as
Tominaga, that El Centro would be the exclusive distributor of non-refrigerated and
monogrammed goods bearing its service marks to Pizza Man franchisees. All franchisees were notified of this change, but were also told that Tominaga would continue to
serve the franchisees with all refrigerated items and miscellaneous supplies. El Centro
claims that the refrigerated items were the most expensive and most profitable items,
while Tominaga complains that they are the least profitable items.
In April 1987, El Centro reinstated Tominaga's authorization to distribute goods
bearing its service mark to its franchisees and notified the suppliers that Tominaga
had been reinstated. Thus, since April, Tominaga and El Centro have competed for
the franchisees' business.

DISCUSSION ***
II.

ANTITRUST CLAIMS

A.

//Jegal Tying Arrangement Claim

A "tying arrangement" occurs where a seller refuses to sell one product (the tying
product) unless the buyer also purchases another product (the tied product). In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 104 S.Ct. 1551, 80 L.Ed.2d 2
(1984), the Court reaffirmed the per se rule against tying. *** Thus, a tying arrangement is illegal per se where the controlling prerequisites are met. Digidyne Corp. v.
Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir.1984), cert denied, 473 U.S. 908, 105 S.Ct.
3534, 87 L.Ed.2d 657 (1985). In order to prevail under a per se theory, plaintiff must
establish the following three elements; "(l) a tie-in between two distinct products or
services; (2) sufficient economic power in the tying product market to impose significant restrictions in the tied product market; and (3) an effect on a non-insubstantial
volume of commerce in the tied product market." Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v.
Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 732 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir.1984). Plaintiff has failed to
present competent evidence that El Centro had market power in the tying market.
It has been observed that the "per se" rule under which tying arrangements are
analyzed is "unusual because of the essential role of economic analysis" in applying the
standard. Klein & Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J.Law
& Econ. 345,345 (1985) *** As recognized by the court in Mozart, the majority in Hyde,
"rather than abandoning the per se rule against tying, chose to limit antitrust liability
for tie-ins by insisting on a showing of actual market power in the tying product." ***
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Tying arrangements, therefore, receive per se condemnation only when "the
seller has some special ability-usually called market power'-to force a purchaser
to do something that he would not do in a competitive market." Hyde, 466 U.S. at
13-14, 104 S.Ct. at 1558-1559. Since the primary purpose of the rule is to prevent the
extension of market power from the tying product to the tied product, 10 market power
is deemed an essential element because such an "extension of power is impossible
unless the seller has substantial market power in the tying product." Mozart, 833 F.2d
at 1345.
Courts have identified three sources of market power; (1) when the government
has granted the seller "a patent or similar monopoly over a product," (2) when the
seller's share of the market is high, and (3) when the seller offers a "unique" product
that competitors are not able to offer. Mozart, 833 F.2d at 1345-1346. Prior to Mozart,
antitrust plaintiffs [sic] would argue that market power could be presumed by virtue
of the uniqueness of the trademark.
A distinctive trademark is "unique" in the sense that it constitutes an identifiable
property right, but it should not be confused in the franchising context with the existence of market power. Klien & Saft, supra, at 355. In Mozart, the court held that a
trademark is "not itself persuasive evidence of economic power." Mozart, 833 F.2d at
1346. As the court in Mozart recognized, market power is not derived from a name or
symbol, but from the product itself. Id. ***

In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir.1971), cert denied, 405 U.S. 955,
92 S.Ct. 1172, 1173, 31 L.Ed.2d 232 (1972), the court reasoned that Chicken Delight
had sufficient market power because "[i]t can hardly be denied that the Chicken
Delight trademark is distinctive; that it possesses goodwill and public acceptance
unique to it and not enjoyed by other fast food chains." Id. at 50. This analysis, however, has been subjected to a crippling attack by Klien & Saft;

10. [3] There are three policy rationales for the per se rule against tying arrangements. The "primary purpose" is to prevent an extension of market power to a new product
market. The so-called "leverage theory" has been criticized because "modern economic
thought seems to indicate that all available monopoly profits could be obtained from the
tying product alone without the use of a tie-in:' Mozart, 833 F.2d at 1345 n. 3 (citing, Bork,
supra, at 373); Hyde, 466 U.S. at 36, 104 S.ct. at 1570-1571 (O'Conner, concurring). Tying
arrangements have also been viewed as a method for facilitating price discrimination. Id.
Such price discrimination occurs where the seller "meters" the buyers [sic] use of the tying
product. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 36 n. 4, 104 S.Ct. at 1571 n. 4 (O'Conner, concurring). In this case
plaintiff has made no such allegations. Furthermore, the proper party to bring suit under
this theory, would be the franchisees not the distributors. Finally, in a regulated industry,
a firm with market power may be unable to extract a supercompetitive profit because it
lacks control over the prices it charges for regulated products or services. Tying may be
used to extract that profit from the sale of unregulated tied products. Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,513, 89 S.Ct. 1252, 1263-1264, 22 L.Ed.2d 495
(1969) (White, dissenting).
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It makes no economic sense to attribute significant market power to the Chicken
Delight trademark. The important economic distinction that must be made is between
pre- and postcontract economic power. Precontract, competition among franchisors
(such as McDonald's or Kentucky Fried Chicken) to sign up franchisees prevents
Chicken Delight from exercising any economic power in setting contract terms with
potential franchisees. Chicken Delight, although it possesses a trademark, does not
possess any economic power in the relevant market in which it operates-the fast food
franchising (or perhaps, more generally, the franchising) market. ***

In this case, plaintiff argues that it need not rely upon a "presumption" of market
power, because El Centro's activity is evidence of market power. Nevertheless, the
above referenced analysis is useful in determining the merits of plaintiffs argument.
Plaintiff charges that ( 1) El Centro demonstrated its market power by increasing
prices of the service marked supplies, and foreclosing plaintiff from distributing such
supplies; and (2) by "locking in" franchisees to the tying product by virtue of their
investment in the franchise.
Plaintiffs argument, however, fails to define the relevant market. In Mozart, the
court emphasized the necessity of defining the relevant market.
The critical issue is whether MBNE [the Mercedes franchisor) possesses the "market
power" to force dealers to purchase the tied product rather than acquire the franchise
to sell a different automobile.

Mozart, 833 F.2d 1346. Thus, as recognized in Mozart, the relevant market would
include other franchises for similar products. Possible relevant markets include take
out pizza franchises, fast food franchises or restaurant franchises in general. Klien &
Saft, supra, at 356 (the relevant market in Chicken Delight was the fast food franchising
market, or perhaps more generally, the franchising market).
Plaintiffs implicit argument is that the relevant market is the "Pizza Man franchising" market. This market definition is erroneous as a matter of law. No reasonable argument can be made that Pizza Man possesses the power to coerce potential
franchisees to purchase the tied product rather than sell a different brand of fast food
(the tying product). The analysis must take place at the "pre-contract" stage. Klien &
Saft, supra, at 356. Plaintiff, however, engages in "post-contract" analysis concerning
defendant's power over already existing franchisees by virtue of their "sunk costs."
This argument was explicitly rejected in Mozart.
Obviously there are costs in surrendering one franchise and acquiring another, but
these costs are unrelated to the "market power" of a unique automobile. These costs
will enable the car maker to extract concessions from the dealer, but this power is
related to the franchise method of doing business, not to the possible uniqueness of
the car.

Mozart, 833 F.2d at 1346-47. The court concluded that the district court's jury instruction was "improperly focused" on the particular franchise [Mercedes dealerships],
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and failed to recognize that the "market" at issue "is the market for dealership franchises:' Id.11
Therefore, plaintiffs argument that the evidence submitted shows there is a
material issue of fact as to defendant's market power is based on an improper market
definition. El Centro's ability to "coerce" its franchisees to purchase a product it [sic]
may not wish to purchase (postcontract), and its claimed ability to raise prices because
of the franchisees [sic] sunk investment, does not show market power in the fast food
franchising market. The "power" exercised is merely the power of a franchisor over its
franchisees. Nothing in the record shows that El Centro had the power (precontract)
to "force" potential franchisees to purchase the tied goods. Such power could only be
exercised by El Centro if the relevant market for the tying product were Pizza Man
franchises. No such showing has been made, nor could such a showing be made.***
Therefore, plaintiff has failed to produce evidence creating a material issue of fact
concerning El Centro's market power in the tying product, and summary judgment
is appropriate.

NOTES
Note 1. The Kreh[ court distinguishes between two types of franchising arrangements: (1) business format franchises and (2) distribution franchises. What are the
differences between these two forms of franchising? Which format is more likely to
generate claims of unlawful tie-ins, and why?
Note 2. The Tominaga court distinguishes between pre- and post-contract market
power. If one accepts the full implication of this distinction, then franchising tie-ins
could never be illegal so long as the market for the franchise-Le., the market in which
potential franchisees decide whether they will be franchisees for Chicken Delight,
McDonald's, Baskin-Robbins, or any other franchisor-is competitive. What sorts of
evidence would you look for to determine whether a particular franchisor had market
power in the franchising market?
Note 3. The Tominaga court's implicit suggestion that post-contract "market
power" is never an antitrust issue so long as there is a competitive upstream market
11. [4] Klien & Saft come to the same conclusion; "Postcontract ... a franchisor can
use the threat of termination to "hold up" a franchisee that has made a specific investment
in the marketing arrangement. However, this potential economic power has nothing to do
with market power, ultimate consumers' welfare, or antitrust:' Klien & Saft, supra, at 356
(emphasis added). The "hold up" of franchisees is a "contract problem;' but not an antitrust
problem. As the axiom provides, the antitrust laws were designed to protect competition,
not competitors; injury to the plaintiff alone (or to the franahisees) is not sufficient to prove
injury to competition. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488, 97
S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977).
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for franchises may have less weight following the Supreme Court's decision in Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). In Kodak, the Court
held in a non-franchise context that, even if a primary market (such as the market for
photocopiers) is competitive, a firm nonetheless could exercise market or monopoly
power in an aftermarket (such as the markets for parts or servicing of photocopiers)
if certain conditions (such as informational deficits and high switching costs) prevent
competition in the primary market from constraining anticompetitive conduct in the
aftermarket. In light of Kodak, Tominaga's distinction between pre- and post-contract
market power may be thought of as a useful line of inquiry rather than a hard-andfast legal rule. Compare Subsolutions, Inc. v. Doctor's Associates, Inc., 1999-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) <J[ 72,677 (D. Conn. 1999) (denying motion to dismiss complaint where at time
of contracting, Subway franchisees possibly could not foresee that computerized cash
registers would become mandatory and that there would be only one approved vendor) with Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 440-41 (3d Cir.
1997) (affirming dismissal of complaint where franchisees could not be locked in to
post-contract market power because they had sufficient information prior to entering
into franchise relationship) and Subsolutions, Inc. v. Doctor's Associates, Inc., 436 F.
Supp. 2d 348, 357 (D. Conn. 2006) (granting Subway franchisor's motion for summary
judgment where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that a prospective franchisee could
not reasonably have anticipated mandatory POS requirement).

Problem 5.1
Until 2010, Chicken Kitchen had an exclusive franchise from the State of Utopia
to operate fast-food restaurants at rest stops on Utopia Turnpike. Chicken Kitchen
in turn granted franchises to several dozen independent operators to run Chicken
Kitchen franchises on the Turnpike. Its franchise agreements required franchisees to
purchase all of their food supplies from Chicken Kitchen. In 2010, the Utopia Legislature passed a statute allowing the operation of up to three fast-food establishments
per rest stop and opening up slots to competitive bidding. Other major franchisors like
McDonald's and Burger King now have a presence on most Utopia rest stops. A group
of Chicken Kitchen franchisees have brought a declaratory judgment action seeking
nullification of the food supply purchase clauses as unlawful tying arrangements.
Chicken Kitchen has responded that the presence of competitors shows that the tying
arrangements cannot harm consumers. How should the case be analyzed?

Ill.

Exclusive Dealing

Many franchise agreements require the franchisee to maintain loyalty to the franchisor and not serve as a franchisee for any other franchisor. The forms of exclusive
dealing between franchisees and franchisors are many. The most easily justified form
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simply commits the franchisee not to operate a second franchise at the same location.
Obviously, Baskin-Robbins would be upset if its franchisees began operating Dairy
Queen franchises out of their locations. In that case, the potential that customers
might be confused as to which ice cream product was which, and that Dairy Queen
would free-ride on Baskin-Robbins' brand, legitimates the restriction.
Some franchise restrictions go further, however, and require the franchisee to
work exclusively for the franchisor. Such exclusive dealing arrangements, if adopted
broadly, could have anticompetitive effects by reducing the number of franchisees
available to new franchisors and thus denying the new franchisors the ability to distribute their goods.
Antitrust's law of exclusive dealing focuses on "foreclosure": the possibility that
an exclusive dealing arrangement will foreclose so much of the market that new firms
will be impeded from entering and the beneficiary of the exclusive dealing commitment will obtain market power as a result. Thus, for a contract to constitute unlawful
exclusive dealing, it must "foreclose competition in a substantial share of the line of
commerce affected***. [T]he opportunities for other traders to enter into or remain
in that market must be significantly limited." Tampa Blee. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,
365 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1961). In Tampa Electric, the Court emphasized the need "to
weigh the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective competition
*** and the probable immediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share of
the market might have on effective comp~tition therein." Id. at 329.
Exclusive dealing arrangements in franchises are analyzed under this rule-ofreason approach.

JOYCE BEVERAGES OF NEW YORK v. ROYAL
CROWN COLA
555 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
MILTON POLLACK, District Judge.
This is an application for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65 Fed.R.
Civ.P. to restrain the defendant from terminating an exclusive franchise to distribute
soft drinks and colas in the New York area and to restrain the defendant from naming
another distributor in place of plaintiff. It is claimed that if the prospective termination does not constitute a breach of the contract between the parties, then the contract
clauses upholding the contract violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act or Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
Finding that the plaintiff has not shown any threat of irreparable damage or probability of success on the merits of the issues with respect to the contract or the antitrust
issues or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground
for litigation with a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the plaintiff, preliminary injunctive relief will be denied.
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The Parties.
Defendant Royal Crown Cola Co. (Royal Crown) is principally engaged in the
licensing of its trademarks and the sale of secret soft drink concentrates to its independent bottlers. Under license from Royal Crown, the bottler uses the secret concentrates to produce finished soft drink products, which the bottler then promotes
and distributes. Royal Crown products include ROYAL CROWN COLA, DIET-RITE
COLA, RC-100, and DECAFFEINATED RC.
In the calendar year ending December 31, 1981, combined sales of the Royal
Crown cola brands accounted for approximately 5 per cent of United States cola sales.
Plaintiff, Joyce Beverages of New York, Inc. (Joyce), manufactures and sells soft
drinks under license from several trademark licensors, including Royal Crown. In
addition to the Royal Crown cola products, Joyce distributes 7-UP lemon-lime soft
drinks, DIET 7-UP, A&W root beer, SUGAR-FREE A&W, PERRIER carbonated
water, NESTEA iced tea, HAWAIIAN PUNCH and Royal Crown's NEHI fruit flavored soft drinks.
Since its origin in the last century, the United States soft drink industry has utilized the franchise system of distribution. Trademark licensors supply certain secret
ingredients under license to local-independent bottlers, who produce, promote and
distribute the finished soft drink products in designated territories. The market is
highly competitive. The local bottlers engage in intense price and nonprice competition with one another.

The Franchises.
Under its license and franchise agreements with Royal Crown, Joyce received
long-term (and in some cases potentially perpetual) exclusive rights to manufacture
and sell the Royal Crown cola products within defined territories in the States of New
York, New Jersey and Connecticut. The Royal Crown products involved herein are
distributed pursuant to three separate contracts which cover ROYAL CROWN COLA,
DIET-RITE COLA and RC-100 and DECAFFEINATED RC. All ofJoyce's license and
franchise agreements with other soft drink trademark licensors restrict Joyce's ability
to bottle other brands of directly competing soft drinks. Thus, for example, Joyce's
7 -UP franchise agreement expressly precludes it from bottling or distributing any
other lemon, lime or lemon-lime soft drinks.
In its ROYAL CROWN and DIET-RITE license and franchise agreements, the
bottler is required to use his "best efforts" to be devoted to building, maintaining and
expanding the sales of those drinks, in a measure "satisfactory" to Royal Crown. These
agreements were prepared and signed many years ago.
The bottler's agreements for DECAFFEINATED RC and RC-100 are up-dated
versions of Royal Crown's license and franchise agreements and contain "exclusive
efforts" clauses which expressly preclude the bottler from distributing any "substantially or reasonably similar" soft drinks and which provide that "any cola shall be
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deemed substantially or reasonably similar to any ... cola [and] any diet cola to any ...
diet cola.... " The "best efforts" clause in these agreements provides that Joyce "shall
devote its best efforts to the sale and promotion of sales of the beverages within and
only within the territory ... so as to achieve maximum distribution and sale for the
beverages within the territory."

Controversy Regarding The Contracts.
Joyce is planning to commence the distribution of a decaffeinated cola product
named LIKE, manufactured by the Seven-Up Company, which will be distributed for
the first time in this area beginning not later than February 7, 1983. ***
This action focuses on the cola licenses and franchise agreements which Joyce
refuses to relinquish and which as colas, whether decaffeinated or not, or whether
containing sugar or not, compete directly with LIKE. The plaintiff has acknowledged
that its actions would violate the DECAFFEINATED RC cola franchise agreement,
except possibly for any saving aspects of the antitrust laws.
Royal Crown contends that the acceptance by Joyce of a so-styled "co-existing"
agreement from Seven-Up to manufacture, market, price, advertise and distribute a
new competitive cola in the New York area creates inevitable and corrosive divided
loyalty and effort and makes impossible a continued relationship between the parties
of confidence and cooperation. Royal Crown contends that it contracted to obtain
Joyce's best promotional effort under its licenses and franchises and had a right to
expect no less and not merely a theoretically "even-handed" consideration as planned
by Joyce.
The evidence establishes that Royal Crown bottlers do and must compete in a
number of ways. In addition to the obvious price competition among colas, Royal
Crown bottlers must compete for shelf space, display racks, promotional rotations and
the placement of feature advertising. The competitive strategies employed by Royal
Crown and its bottlers are highly confidential.
The acceptance of a license and franchise obligation to distribute and promote
LIKE, the competitive cola of Seven-Up, factually and legally breaches Joyce's obligation to devote its "best efforts" to handle and expand Royal Crown's sales and to
cooperate satisfactorily with Royal Crown in the manner in which Joyce is obligated
under the licenses and franchises.
A best efforts clause is not per se breached by a mere undertaking of a competitive product line. Cf Polyglycoat Corp. v. C.P.C. Distributors, 534 F.Supp. 200
(S.D.N.Y.1982); it depends on the circumstances. However, the circumstances demonstrated by the record of the hearing establish beyond peradventure of doubt that
Joyce's proposed effort to sell the new line of product to the established customers
of the old product and the plan to use advertising and distribution methods developed in the promotion of the first for the promotion of the second product breaches
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the best efforts clause both factually and legally. The evidence establishes that the
activity of Joyce would be so manifestly harmful to Royal Crown that it justifies the
Court in finding that the new obligations to which Joyce has committed itself and its
intended conduct breach its covenant to promote the product of Royal Crown. Joyce
will control pricing, placement of local advertisements, special promotions, feature
advertising and special displays of the two competitive products. It is important to
emphasize that as a LIKE bottler, Joyce has already begun to convince retailers to purchase and display that product in their stores, and in connection therewith plans to
offer them a massive give-away, without charge, of LIKE to induce promotion thereof
by the retailers and to gain good will therefor. Retailers have been and will be asked to
devote a portion of their limited cola budgets and to edge into their shelf space a cola
product competitive to Royal Crown. In addition, Joyce will begin seeking and seizing
promotional and merchandising opportunities on behalf of LIKE cola. These activities
will necessarily dilute Joyce's efforts on behalf of the Royal Crown colas. Joyce has
thus impaired and disabled itself from devoting its "best efforts" to Royal Crown and
from promoting the Royal Crown sales in a "manner ... satisfactory" to Royal Crown.
The described conduct and promotional plans ofJoyce are a breach of the best efforts
clauses contained in the Royal Crown contracts.
A few examples of the material conflicts which Joyce has created and is bent on
may be examined. For example, Seven-Up's national advertising campaign denigrates
the content of Royal Crown cola products. Seven-Up's slogan is "You don't need caffeine and neither does your cola." Joyce's affiliated operations in Chicago, Illinois, and
Washington, D.C., sponsor this very campaign in their respective territories and have
supported advertisements thus materially denigrating the content of Royal Crown
products. Joyce's LIKE franchise agreement requires it to sponsor this same campaign
unless it believes that the campaign disparages the product of Royal Crown. It has
already indicated by its mid-western distribution where it stands on such advertising.
The vice-president of Seven-Up called by Joyce as one of its witnesses testified unequivocally that Seven-Up expects to use such a slogan in promoting LIKE in this area. Such
advertisements in the franchised areas other than in New York warn of the supposed
dangers of caffeine in an attempt to shift consumers away from ROYAL CROWN,
DIET-RITE and other caffeinated colas. The sponsorship of such advertisements by
Seven-Up's representatives or on behalf of Seven-Up or by Seven-Up in the Royal
Crown territories will actually jeopardize Royal Crown's reputation among consumers.
Joyce has not committed itself to refuse the use of such advertising in this area. ***
Further examples of the clashes in handling the conflicting interests that Joyce will
face if it tries to distribute both Royal Crown and LIKE include the need to keep each
one's market strategies confidential and the selection of which cola should receive
discount promotions the timing and the extent thereof. The latter are particularly
relevant, as Royal Crown has historically competed by projecting itself as a low-price
cola alternative to the major brands.
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Plaintiff argued that it will be able to protect the interests of Royal Crown and
LIKE "evenhandedly." *** In light of the already planned giveaways of cases of LIKE,
which will be an essential part of the promotion of LIKE, Joyce itself, right from the
start, would have to subsidize equally large promotional discounts on behalf of Royal
Crown cola products-whether or not requisite or timely-to impose even treatment.
It strains credulity to think that Joyce is willing or able to take on LIKE and still promote Royal Crown evenhandedly, much less with its best efforts focused on its best
interests under the circumstances.
Plaintiff argues that Royal Crown will not be forced to "sink or swim" on its own
nor will it be allowed to go "down the drain." These arguments demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the meaning of "best efforts." Joyce's duty is to expand
Royal Crown's market share, to promote it vigorously, and not merely to keep it alive.
The impracticality of one distributor promoting more than one cola at a time has
been clearly developed in the record. A market expert testified that if Joyce were to
distribute both Royal Crown cola and LIKE that one of the products would fail within
two to three years. In addition, the contract that Seven-Up executed with Joyce provides that if at any point Joyce stops distributing Royal Crown cola, it may never again
distribute another cola along with LIKE. Thus, even Seven-Up's strategy manifests
the fundamental fact of business life that promotion of a cola product is deterred by
the distribution of another cola product by the same distributor. Seven-Up has made
crystal clear that it is unwilling to live with co-existence any longer than it has to.
There is no question but that the second distributorship which Joyce elected to
contract for and that it is avidly implementing is factually and legally inconsistent with
the "best efforts" obligation in the Royal Crown distributorship agreement-Joyce
cannot properly serve two masters in the adverse relationship. The Court finds that
Joyce will not be able to continue in the requisite rigorous promotion of Royal Crown
while focusing on its individual interests in devoting its efforts to LIKE. ***
In sum, the actions ofJoyce are and constitute a material breach of its obligations
to Royal Crown under their agreements. Under all the facts and circumstances presented here, cancellation of the Royal Crown franchises and licenses to Joyce would
not be a breach on the part of Royal Crown.
Joyce has not demonstrated any likelihood of success on its claim under the contract, nor has it shown any question that presents a fair ground for litigation.

Antitrust Matters.
The exclusive dealing arrangement with Royal Crown does not violate the test
of legality set out in the Clayton Act (and thus necessarily, in these circumstances,
does not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act). *** The economic justification for the
exclusive dealing contracts is seen in the necessity for each bottler to carry only one
product in order to increase the competition between the brands. Since the dawn of
the industry, soft drink bottlers have carried only one national cola brand, only one

Antitrust Principles Affecting Franchise Law

207

national brand of lemon-lime beverage, etcetera. This practice insures that the bottler devotes undivided loyalty to its particular brand and that it competes vigorously
against all competing brands. The bottlers have agreed to devote their "best efforts" to
a single brand of each type of national soft drink. In exchange for this and to promote
competition, soft drink trademark owners have granted long term (often perpetual)
territorially exclusive licenses to their bottlers.
The effect of the exclusive distributorship does not substantially lessen competition, as was demonstrated by the credible testimony, nor does it tend to create a
monopoly in the line of commerce here present. 15 U.S.C. § 14. 12
Joyce has asserted that the following criteria must be met before a distributor can
adequately represent LIKE in the New York Metropolitan Area market:
1. The distributor must be able to reach the entire market area.
2. The distributor must have an adequate level of volume so that it can
command compliance from the retail sellers.
3. The distributor must be able to sell to stores, fast-food chains, restaurants,
and through vending machines.
4. The distributor must have adequate supply facilities and a history of
acceptable performance in the distribution of Seven-Up products.

Joyce has not borne its burden of showing that LIKE will be foreclosed from the
market by reason of any inability to find a distributor meeting these qualifications in
New York. There are viable alternative methods of distribution for LIKE in the New
York area. Other distributors besides Joyce, many of whom even presently distribute
other Seven-Up products, have expressed their willingness to distribute LIKE. Indeed,
a vice-president of the Seven-Up Company testified that Joyce was not the company's
only choice for a distributor in New York, but merely its first choice. LIKE, while it
is a new Seven-Up Company entrant, cannot be characterized as a fledgling product.
It is sponsored by the Seven-Up Company, is being distributed in other areas, and
behind the Seven-Up Company is its affluent parent, Philip Morris. Thus, LIKE has
the prestige, resources and contacts to ease its way into the market it seeks to add.
There has been no showing that the use of a dealer with all of the above characteristics
is necessary for market entry. There is no showing that this list of characteristics is met
by distributors in other regions of the country where Seven-Up will distribute LIKE.

12. [SJ The test for a violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act is set forth in Tampa
Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 81 S.Ct. 623, 5 L.Ed.2d 580 (1961); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 69 S.Ct. 1051, 93 L.Ed. 1371 (1949). In addition to
evaluating the foreclosure of competition, it is necessary to consider the economic justification for the challenged clause. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
379 U.S. 885, 85 S.Ct. 158, 13 L.Ed.2d 91 (1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125, 85 S.Ct. 1364,
14 L.Ed.2d 284 (1965).
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A market expert testified that LIKE will be able to satisfactorily penetrate the
market even ifJoyce is not its distributor. Indeed, it appears from a preponderance
of the evidence that the Court credits that the above list was presented merely
to describe Joyce and not the necessary distributor. There are numerous ways in
which Seven-Up will be able to enter the New York market. There has been no
credible showing that the absence of any of the listed characteristics will prejudice
LIKE's entry.
Joyce argues that if it does not maintain the Royal Crown franchise, it will not be
strong enough to promote LIKE successfully. This argument is not credible. There
has been no showing that any other company will terminate Joyce ifJoyce is unable to
continue to distribute Royal Crown products. There has been no evidence presented
of what volume of sales by Joyce is necessary to allow it to maintain its distributorships
for the other beverage manufacturers, and there has been no showing that if Joyce
begins to distribute LIKE instead of Royal Crown there will be a decrease in the overall
volume sold by Joyce.
To the contrary, the credible evidence establishes that all parties feel that LIKE will
be able to replace the volume of Royal Crown products, after a temporary period of
adjustment. Thus, Joyce, without Royal Crown, will be able to promote LIKE, according to the witnesses.
Indeed, the arrangement that will arise ifJoyce distributes LIKE and Royal Crown
uses another distributor or set of distributors, increases rather than forecloses competition, as four distributors would then be distributing four colas. The equivalent
will result if Joyce continues to distribute Royal Crown and Seven-Up uses another
distributor or distributors. Under either situation, there will be the "fierce" interbrand
competition testified to between Coke, Pepsi, Royal Crown and LIKE. If both LIKE
and Royal Crown were in the hands of Joyce, these two colas would "never" compete
with one another, according to John M. Joyce, III.
The crucial inquiry is whether the opportunities for other competitors to enter
or remain in the market has [sic] been significantly limited. The test is whether the
system of challenged exclusivity arrangements in fact forecloses competition from a
substantial market.
On the facts and circumstances shown herein, there is no antitrust law impediment to the entry into the market or to competition or to termination ofJoyce's license
and franchise from Royal Crown on the basis ofJoyce's election to accept a franchise
from Seven-Up. The indicia for these findings and conclusion are ample.
Even if it is costly for Joyce to distribute LIKE, this does not mean that Seven-Up
is being deterred from entering the cola market. Seven-Up is a large, well-financed
company, solidly backed by its parent, Philip Morris, and has the ability and means to
get into the cola market with LIKE.
No matter how the market is defined, Seven-Up is not being foreclosed from
entering into the New York area with LIKE. The way the market has been traditionally
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structured with exclusive bottler representation is consistent with and aids competition-while coexisting franchisers would tend to deter competition.
Royal Crown is neither a dominant nor a leading firm in the New York area; its
insignificant market share places it a distant third behind Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola,
the true giants of the cola industry. In contrast, Joyce is one of the nation's largest soft
drink bottlers not under contract with Coke or Pepsi.
Enforcement of the license and franchise agreements between Joyce and Royal
Crown will actually promote competition by assuring the New York area of four vigorous cola competitors: A Coke bottler, a Pepsi bottler, a LIKE bottler, and a Royal
Crown bottler. The agreement also assures that LIKE and the Royal Crown colas will
compete against one another, rather than falling under Joyce's common control and
"never" competing.
This promotion of competition which will result from the construction of the best
efforts clause as an exclusive dealing clause is an economic justification of the exclusivity requirement. Even if the Court were to find, which it does not, that LIKE was
slightly deterred from entering the New York market, the promotion of competition
would constitute an offsetting economic justification of the clause.
Thus, Joyce has not demonstrated any likelihood of success on the merits of its
claim that Royal Crown's termination of the contract will violate either the Sherman
or Clayton Acts. Nor has Joyce presented any question that presents a fair ground for
litigation. ***

NOTES
Note 4. The franchise agreements at issue in Joyce Beverages raised both contract

interpretation and antitrust issues. One solution the court could have chosen, if it had
been concerned about the competitive effects of an exclusive dealing interpretation of
the contract, would have been to interpret the "best efforts" provisions narrowly so
as not to find a conflict in Joyce's distribution of Seven-Up's new cola product. Antitrust concerns can sometimes shape the interpretation of an ambiguous contract. See,
e.g., Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 404 Mass. 419,431, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1262 (Mass. 1989)
(construing restrictive covenant in partnership agreement not to prohibit departing
partner to remove clients to new firm in order to safeguard public interest in competition between lawyers).
Note 5. Note that there were two different kinds of "exclusivity" provisions in
Joyce Beverages. Joyce was granted an exclusive territory to market RC Cola, and the
company also had an obligation not to market any competitive cola product in that
territory. Which of these two forms of exclusivity raises greater concerns from a com petition perspective and why?
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Some states prohibit as per se illegal post-term covenants not to compete in franchise agreements. See, e.g., Dayton Time Lock Serv., Inc. v. Silent Watchman Corp., 52
Cal. App. 3d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1975). Dayton Time involved an exclusive dealing
arrangement in a franchise agreement that allowed the franchisee exclusive distribu tion rights on the West Coast for a ten-year period, prohibited the franchisee from
distributing any product made by a competitor of the franchisor's during the franchise
term, and prohibited the franchisee from competing with the franchisor for a ten-year
period following the termination of the franchise. The franchisee filed a declaratory
judgment action seeking a declaration that the exclusivity restrictions were anticompetitive and unenforceable. The court held that the post-franchise covenant not to
compete was illegal and unenforceable but that the franchisee failed to meet its burden
of proving that the in-term restrictions substantially foreclosed competition in the
relevant market.

IV. Resale Price Maintenance
Resale price maintenance occurs when an upstream firm, typically a manufacturer or
licensor, contractually controls a downstream firm's (usually a wholesaler's or retailer's) resale price. If, for example, Coca-Cola's distribution contracts set the price at
which the company's distributors sell Coke products at retail, that is a form of resale
price maintenance.
The law of resale price maintenance makes an interesting historical study, but
for present purposes it can be stated briefly. Between 1911 and 2007, minimum resale
price maintenance-Le., a manufacturer specifying a minimum resale price-was per
se illegal. Between 1968 and 1997, maximum resale price maintenance was also per se
illegal. The two cases that ended the per se illegality and swept vertical price maintenance into the rule of reason are State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997) and the
Leegin decision now presented.

LEEGIN CREATIVE LEATHER PRODUCTS v. PSKS
551 U.S. 877 (2007)
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376,
55 L.Ed. 502 (1911), the Court established the rule that it is per se illegal under§ 1
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, for a manufacturer to agree with its distributor
to set the minimum price the distributor can charge for the manufacturer's goods.
The question presented by the instant case is whether the Court should overrule the
per se rule and allow resale price maintenance agreements to be judged by the rule
of reason, the usual standard applied to determine if there is a violation of § 1. The
JUSTICE KENNEDY
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Court has abandoned the rule of per se illegality for other vertical restraints a manufacturer imposes on its distributors. Respected economic analysts, furthermore,
conclude that vertical price restraints can have procompetitive effects. We now hold
that Dr. Miles should be overruled and that vertical price restraints are to be judged
by the rule of reason.

Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. (Leegin), designs, manufactures, and distributes leather goods and accessories. In 1991, Leegin began to sell belts
under the brand name "Brighton." The Brighton brand has now expanded into a
variety of women's fashion accessories. It is sold across the United States in over 5,000
retail establishments, for the most part independent, small boutiques and specialty
stores. Leegin's president, Jerry Kohl, also has an interest in about 70 stores that sell
Brighton products. Leegin asserts that, at least for its products, small retailers treat
customers better, provide customers more services, and make their shopping experience more satisfactory than do larger, often impersonal retailers. Kohl explained:
"[W]e want the consumers to get a different experience than they get in Sam's Club or
in Wal-Mart. And you can't get that kind of experience or support or customer service
from a store like Wal-Mart."***
Respondent, PSKS, Inc. (PSKS), operates Kay's Kloset, a women's apparel store in
Lewisville, Texas. Kay's Kloset buys from about 75 different manufacturers and at one
time sold the Brighton brand. It first started purchasing Brighton goods from Leegin
in 1995. Once it began selling the brand, the store promoted Brighton. For example, it
ran Brighton advertisements and had Brighton days in the store. Kay's Kloset became
the destination retailer in the area to buy Brighton products. Brighton was the store's
most important brand and once accounted for 40 to 50 percent of its profits.
In 1997, Leegin instituted the "Brighton Retail Pricing and Promotion Policy."
4 id., at 939. Following the policy, Leegin refused to sell to retailers that discounted
Brighton goods below suggested prices. The policy contained an exception for products not selling well that the retailer did not plan on reordering. In the letter to retailers
establishing the policy, Leegin stated:
"In this age of mega stores like Macy's, Bloomingdales, May Co. and others, consumers are perplexed by promises of product quality and support of product which we
believe is lacking in these large stores. Consumers are further confused by the ever
popular sale, sale, sale, etc.
"We, at Leegin, choose to break away from the pack by selling [at] specialty stores;
specialty stores that can offer the customer great quality merchandise, superb service,
and support the Brighton product 365 days a year on a consistent basis.
"We realize that half the equation is Leegin producing great Brighton product and the
other half is you, our retailer, creating great looking stores selling our products in a
quality manner:• Ibid.
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Leegin adopted the policy to give its retailers sufficient margins to provide customers
the service central to its distribution strategy. It also expressed concern that discounting harmed Brighton's brand image and reputation.
A year after instituting the pricing policy Leegin introduced a marketing strategy
known as the "Heart Store Program." See Id., at 962-972. It offered retailers incentives
to become Heart Stores, and, in exchange, retailers pledged, among other things, to sell
at Leegin's suggested prices. Kay's Kloset became a Heart Store soon after Leegin created the program. After a Leegin employee visited the store and found it unattractive,
the parties appear to have agreed that Kay's Kloset would not be a Heart Store beyond
1998. Despite losing this status, Kay's Kloset continued to increase its Brighton sales.
In December 2002, Leegin discovered Kay's Kloset had been marking down
Brighton's entire line by 20 percent. Kay's Kloset contended it placed Brighton products on sale to compete with nearby retailers who also were undercutting Leegin's
suggested prices. Leegin, nonetheless, requested that Kay's Kloset cease discounting.
Its request refused, Leegin stopped selling to the store. The loss of the Brighton brand
had a considerable negative impact on the store's revenue from sales.
PSKS sued Leegin in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas. It alleged, among other claims, that Leegin had violated the antitrust laws by
"enter[ing] into agreements with retailers to charge only those prices fixed by Leegin."
Id., at 1236. Leegin planned to introduce expert testimony describing the procompetitive effects of its pricing policy. The District Court excluded the testimony, relying
on the per se rule established by Dr. Miles. At trial PSKS argued that the Heart Store
program, among other things, demonstrated Leegin and its retailers had agreed to
fix prices. Leegin responded that it had established a unilateral pricing policy lawful
under§ 1, which applies only to concerted action. See United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U.S. 300, 307, 39 S.Ct. 465, 63 L.Ed. 992 (1919). The jury agreed with PSKS and
awarded it $1.2 million. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § lS(a), the District Court trebled the
damages and reimbursed PSKS for its attorney's fees and costs. It entered judgment
against Leegin in the amount of $3,975,000.80. ***
We granted certiorari to determine whether vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements should continue to be treated as per se unlawful.

II
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States." *** While § 1 could be interpreted to proscribe all contracts, see,
e.g., Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States,***, the Court has never "taken a literal
approach to [its] language," Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, ***. Rather, the Court has repeated
time and again that§ 1 "outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints."***
The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains
trade in violation of§ 1. *** "Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the cir-
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cumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited
as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition." *** Appropriate factors to
take into account include "specific information about the relevant business" and
"the restraint's history, nature, and effect."*** Whether the businesses involved have
market power is a further, significant consideration. *** In its design and function the
rule distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to
the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer's best
interest.
The rule of reason does not govern all restraints. Some types "are deemed unlawful per se." *** The per se rule, treating categories of restraints as necessarily illegal,
eliminates the need to study the reasonableness of an individual restraint in light of
the real market forces at work, *** and, it must be acknowledged, the per se rule can
give clear guidance for certain conduct. Restraints that are per se unlawful include
horizontal agreements among competitors to fix prices,*** or to divide markets***.
Resort to per se rules is confined to restraints, like those mentioned, "that would
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output."*** To justify a per se prohibition a restraint must have "manifestly anticompetitive" effects ***
and "lack ... any redeeming virtue,"***.
As a consequence, the per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue, see Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9, 99 S.Ct. 1551, 60 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979),
and only if courts can predict with confidence that it would be invalidated in all or
almost all instances under the rule of reason, see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 344, 102 S.Ct. 2466, 73 L.Ed.2d 48 (1982). It should come as no
surprise, then, that "we have expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with regard to
restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic impact
of certain practices is not immediately obvious." *** And, as we have stated, a "departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic
effect rather than ... upon formalistic line drawing." ***

Ill
The Court has interpreted Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376, as establishing a per se rule against a vertical agreement
between a manufacturer and its distributor to set minimum resale prices. *** In Dr.
Miles the plaintiff, a manufacturer of medicines, sold its products only to distributors
who agreed to resell them at set prices. The Court found the manufacturer's control
of resale prices to be unlawful. It relied on the common-law rule that "a general
restraint upon alienation is ordinarily invalid." *** The Court then explained that
the agreements would advantage the distributors, not the manufacturer, and were
analogous to a combination among competing distributors, which the law treated as
void.***
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The reasoning of the Court's more recent jurisprudence has rejected the rationales
on which Dr. Miles was based. By relying on the common-law rule against restraints
on alienation, *** the Court justified its decision based on "formalistic" legal doctrine rather than "demonstrable economic effect," ***. The Court in Dr. Miles relied
on a treatise published in 1628, but failed to discuss in detail the business reasons
that would motivate a manufacturer situated in 1911 to make use of vertical price
restraints. Yet the Sherman Act's use of "restraint of trade" "invokes the common law
itself, ... not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in
1890." *** The general restraint on alienation, especially in the age when then-Justice
Hughes used the term, tended to evoke policy concerns extraneous to the question that
controls here. Usually associated with land, not chattels, the rule arose from restrictions removing real property from the stream of commerce for generations. The Court
should be cautious about putting dispositive weight on doctrines from antiquity but of
slight relevance. We reaffirm that "the state of the common law 400 or even 100 years
ago is irrelevant to the issue before us: the effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical
distributional restraints in the American economy today." ***
Dr. Miles, furthermore, treated vertical agreements a manufacturer makes with its
distributors as analogous to a horizontal combination among competing distributors.
*** In later cases, however, the Court rejected the approach of reliance on rules governing horizontal restraints when defining rules applicable to vertical ones. *** Our
recent cases formulate antitrust principles in accordance with the appreciated differences in economic effect between vertical and horizontal agreements, differences the
Dr. Miles Court failed to consider.
The reasons upon which Dr. Miles relied do not justify a per se rule. As a consequence, it is necessary to examine, in the first instance, the economic effects of vertical
agreements to fix minimum resale prices, and to determine whether the per se rule is
nonetheless appropriate. ***

A
Though each side of the debate can find sources to support its position, it suffices
to say here that economics literature is replete with procompetitive justifications for
a manufacturer's use of resale price maintenance. See, e.g., Brief for Economists as
Amici Curiae 16 ("In the theoretical literature, it is essentially undisputed that minimum [resale price maintenance] can have procompetitive effects and that under a
variety of market conditions it is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects"); Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 9 ("[T]here is a widespread consensus that permitting
a manufacturer to control the price at which its goods are sold may promote interbrand competition and consumer welfare in a variety of ways"); ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law and Economics of Product Distribution 76 (2006) ("[T]he
bulk of the economic literature on [resale price maintenance] suggests that [it] is more
likely to be used to enhance efficiency than for anticompetitive purposes"); see also
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H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution 184-191 (2005)
(hereinafter Hovenkamp ); R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 288-291 ( 1978) (hereinafter
Bork). Even those more skeptical of resale price maintenance acknowledge it can have
procompetitive effects. See, e.g., Brief for William S. Comanor et al. as Amici Curiae 3
("[G]iven [the] diversity of effects [of resale price maintenance], one could reasonably
take the position that a rule of reason rather than a per se approach is warranted");
F.M. Scherer & D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 558
(3d ed.1990) (hereinafter Scherer & Ross) ("The overall balance between benefits and
costs [of resale price maintenance] is probably close").
The few recent studies documenting the competitive effects of resale price maintenance also cast doubt on the conclusion that the practice meets the criteria for a per
se rule.***
The justifications for vertical price restraints are similar to those for other vertical
restraints.*** Minimum resale price maintenance can stimulate interbrand competition-the competition among manufacturers selling different brands of the same type
of product-by reducing intrabrand competition-the competition among retailers
selling the same brand. *** The promotion of interbrand competition is important
because "the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect [this type of] competition."*** A single manufacturer's use of vertical price restraints tends to eliminate
intrabrand price competition; this in turn encourages retailers to invest in tangible
or intangible services or promotional efforts that aid the manufacturer's position
as against rival manufacturers. Resale price maintenance also has the potential to
give consumers more options so that they can choose among low-price, low-service
brands; high-price, high-service brands; and brands that fall in between.
Absent vertical price restraints, the retail services that enhance interbrand competition might be underprovided. This is because discounting retailers can free ride on
retailers who furnish services and then capture some of the increased demand those
services generate. *** Consumers might learn, for example, about the benefits of a
manufacturer's product from a retailer that invests in fine showrooms, offers product
demonstrations, or hires and trains knowledgeable employees. R. Posner, Antitrust
Law 172-173 (2d ed.2001) (hereinafter Posner). Or consumers might decide to buy
the product because they see it in a retail establishment that has a reputation for selling high-quality merchandise. *** If the consumer can then buy the product from a
retailer that discounts because it has not spent capital providing services or developing
a quality reputation, the high-service retailer will lose sales to the discounter, forcing
it to cut back its services to a level lower than consumers would otherwise prefer.
Minimum resale price maintenance alleviates the problem because it prevents the
discounter from undercutting the service provider. With price competition decreased,
the manufacturer's retailers compete among themselves over services.
Resale price maintenance, in addition, can increase interbrand competition
by facilitating market entry for new firms and brands. "[N]ew manufacturers and
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manufacturers entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor
that is often required in the distribution of products unknown to the consumer."
GTE Sylvania, supra, at 55, 97 S.Ct. 2549; see Marvel & McCafferty 349 (noting that
reliance on a retailer's reputation "will decline as the manufacturer's brand becomes
better known, so that [resale price maintenance] may be particularly important as a
competitive device for new entrants"). New products and new brands are essential to a
dynamic economy, and if markets can be penetrated by using resale price maintenance
there is a procompetitive effect.
Resale price maintenance can also increase interbrand competition by encouraging retailer services that would not be provided even absent free riding. It may be
difficult and inefficient for a manufacturer to make and enforce a contract with a
retailer specifying the different services the retailer must perform. Offering the retailer
a guaranteed margin and threatening termination if it does not live up to expectations
may be the most efficient way to expand the manufacturer's market share by inducing the retailer's performance and allowing it to use its own initiative and experience
in providing valuable services. See Mathewson & Winter, The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance, 13 Rev. Indus. Org. 57, 74-75 (1998) (hereinafter
Mathewson & Winter); Klein & Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement
Mechanisms, 31 J. Law & Econ. 265,295 (1988); see also Deneckere, Marvel, & Peck,
Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance, 111 Q.J. Econ. 885,
911 (1996) (noting that resale price maintenance may be beneficial to motivate retailers to stock adequate inventories of a manufacturer's goods in the face of uncertain
consumer demand).

8
While vertical agreements setting minimum resale prices can have procompetitive justifications, they may have anticompetitive effects in other cases; and unlawful
price fixing, designed solely to obtain monopoly profits, is an ever present temptation. Resale price maintenance may, for example, facilitate a manufacturer cartel. ***
An unlawful cartel will seek to discover if some manufacturers are undercutting the
cartel's fixed prices. Resale price maintenance could assist the cartel in identifying
price-cutting manufacturers who benefit from the lower prices they offer. Resale price
maintenance, furthermore, could discourage a manufacturer from cutting prices to
retailers with the concomitant benefit of cheaper prices to consumers. ***
Vertical price restraints also "might be used to organize cartels at the retailer
level." *** A group of retailers might collude to fix prices to consumers and then compel a manufacturer to aid the unlawful arrangement with resale price maintenance. In
that instance the manufacturer does not establish the practice to stimulate services or
to promote its brand but to give inefficient retailers higher profits. Retailers with better distribution systems and-lower cost structures would be prevented from charging
lower prices by the agreement. See Posner 172; Overstreet 13-19. Historical exam-
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ples suggest this possibility is a legitimate concern. See, e.g., Marvel & McCafferty,
The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 28

J.

Law & Econ. 363, 373 (1985)

(hereinafter Marvel) (providing an example of the power of the National Association
of Retail Druggists to compel manufacturers to use resale price maintenance); Hovenkamp 186 (suggesting that the retail druggists in Dr. Miles formed a cartel and used
manufacturers to enforce it).
A horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or competing retailers that
decreases output or reduces competition in order to increase price is, and ought to be,

per se unlawful.*** To the extent a vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices
is entered upon to facilitate either type of cartel, it, too, would need to be held unlawful under the rule of reason. This type of agreement may also be useful evidence for a
plaintiff attempting to prove the existence of a horizontal cartel.
Resale price maintenance, furthermore, can be abused by a powerful manufacturer or retailer. A dominant retailer, for example, might request resale price maintenance to forestall innovation in distribution that decreases costs. A manufacturer
might consider it has little choice but to accommodate the retailer's demands for
vertical price restraints if the manufacturer believes it needs access to the retailer's
distribution network. See Overstreet 31; 8 P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law
47 (2d ed.2004) (hereinafter Areeda & Hovenkamp); cf. Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221
F.3d 928, 937-938 (C.A.7 2000). A manufacturer with market power, by comparison,
might use resale price maintenance to give retailers an incentive not to sell the products of smaller rivals or new entrants. See, e.g., Marvel 366-368. As should be evident,
the potential anticompetitive consequences of vertical price restraints must not be
ignored or underestimated.

C
Notwithstanding the risks of unlawful conduct, it cannot be stated with any
degree of confidence that resale price maintenance "always or almost always tend[s] to
restrict competition and decrease output." Business Electronics, supra, at 723, 108 S.Ct.
1515 (internal quotation marks omitted). Vertical agreements establishing minimum
resale prices can have either procompetitive or anticompetitive effects, depending
upon the circumstances in which they are formed. And although the empirical evidence on the topic is limited, it does not suggest efficient uses of the agreements are
infrequent or hypothetical. See Overstreet 170; see also id., at 80 (noting that for the
majority of enforcement actions brought by the Federal Trade Commission between
1965 and 1982, "the use of [resale price maintenance] was not likely motivated by collusive dealers who had successfully coerced their suppliers"); Ippolito 292 (reaching a
similar conclusion). As the rule would proscribe a significant amount of procompetitive conduct, these agreements appear ill suited for per se condemnation.
Respondent contends, nonetheless, that vertical price restraints should be per se
unlawful because of the administrative convenience of per se rules. *** That argument
suggests per se illegality is the rule rather than the exception. This misinterprets our
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antitrust law. Per se rules may decrease administrative costs, but that is only part
of the equation. Those rules can be counterproductive. They can increase the total
cost of the antitrust system by prohibiting procompetitive conduct the antitrust laws
should encourage. See Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason,
53 Antitrust L.J. 135, 158 (1984) (hereinafter Easterbrook). They also may increase
litigation costs by promoting frivolous suits against legitimate practices. The Court
has thus explained that administrative "advantages are not sufficient in themselves to
justify the creation of per se rules," *** and has relegated their use to restraints that are
"manifestly anticompetitive," ***. Were the Court now to conclude that vertical price
restraints should be per se illegal based on administrative costs, we would undermine,
if not overrule, the traditional "demanding standards" for adopting per se rules. ***
Any possible reduction in administrative costs cannot alone justify the Dr. Miles rule.
Respondent also argues the per se rule is justified because a vertical price restraint
can lead to higher prices for the manufacturer's goods. See also Overstreet 160 (noting
that "price surveys indicate that [resale price maintenance] in most cases increased
the prices of products sold"). Respondent is mistaken in relying on pricing effects
absent a further showing of anticompetitive conduct. Cf. id., at 106 (explaining that
price surveys "do not necessarily tell us anything conclusive about the welfare effects
of [resale price maintenance] because the results are generally consistent with both
procompetitive and anticompetitive theories"). For, as has been indicated already, the
antitrust laws are designed primarily to protect interbrand competition, from which
lower prices can later result. *** The Court, moreover, has evaluated other vertical
restraints under the rule of reason even though prices can be increased in the course
of promoting procompetitive effects. *** And resale price maintenance may reduce
prices if manufacturers have resorted to costlier alternatives of controlling resale
prices that are not per se unlawful. ***
Respondent's argument, furthermore, overlooks that, in general, the interests of
manufacturers and consumers are aligned with respect to retailer profit margins. The
difference between the price a manufacturer charges retailers and the price retailers
charge consumers represents part of the manufacturer's cost of distribution, which, like
any other cost, the manufacturer usually desires to minimize. See GTE Sylvania, 433
U.S., at 56, n. 24, 97 S.Ct. 2549; see also id., at 56, 97 S.Ct. 2549 ("Economists ... have
argued that manufacturers have an economic interest in maintaining as much intrabrand competition as is consistent with the efficient distribution of their products"). A
manufacturer has no incentive to overcompensate retailers with unjustified margins.
The retailers, not the manufacturer, gain from higher retail prices. The manufacturer
often loses; interbrand competition reduces its competitiveness and market share
because consumers will "substitute a different brand of the same product."*** As a general matter, therefore, a single manufacturer will desire to set minimum resale prices
only if the "increase in demand resulting from enhanced service ... will more than
offset a negative impact on demand of a higher retail price." Mathewson & Winter 67.
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The implications of respondent's position are far reaching. Many decisions a
manufacturer makes and carries out through concerted action can lead to higher
prices. A manufacturer might, for example, contract with different suppliers to obtain
better inputs that improve product quality. Or it might hire an advertising agency to
promote awareness of its goods. Yet no one would think these actions violate the Sherman Act because they lead to higher prices. The antitrust laws do not require manufacturers to produce generic goods that consumers do not know about or want. The
manufacturer strives to improve its product quality or to promote its brand because
it believes this conduct will lead to increased demand despite higher prices. The same
can hold true for resale price maintenance.
Resale price maintenance, it is true, does have economic dangers. If the rule of
reason were to apply to vertical price restraints, courts would have to be diligent in
eliminating their anticompetitive uses from the market. This is a realistic objective,
and certain factors are relevant to the inquiry. For example, the number of manufacturers that make use of the practice in a given industry can provide important
instruction. When only a few manufacturers lacking market power adopt the practice,
there is little likelihood it is facilitating a manufacturer cartel, for a cartel then can
be undercut by rival manufacturers. See Overstreet 22; Bork 294. Likewise, a retailer
cartel is unlikely when only a single manufacturer in a competitive market uses resale
price maintenance. Interbrand competition would divert consumers to lower priced
substitutes and eliminate any gains to retailers from their price-fixing agreement over
a single brand. See Posner 172; Bork 292. Resale price maintenance should be subject
to more careful scrutiny, by contrast, if many competing manufacturers adopt the
practice. Cf. Scherer & Ross 558 (noting that "except when [resale price maintenance]
spreads to cover the bulk of an industry's output, depriving consumers of a meaningful choice between high-service and low-price outlets, most [resale price maintenance
arrangements] are probably innocuous"); Easterbrook 162 (suggesting that "every one
of the potentially-anticompetitive outcomes of vertical arrangements depends on the
uniformity of the practice").
The source of the restraint may also be an important consideration. If there is
evidence retailers were the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel or supports a dominant, inefficient
retailer. See Brief for William S. Comanor et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8. If, by contrast, a
manufacturer adopted the policy independent of retailer pressure, the restraint is less
likely to promote anticompetitive conduct. Cf. Posner 177 ("It makes all the difference
whether minimum retail prices are imposed by the manufacturer in order to evoke
point-of-sale services or by the dealers in order to obtain monopoly profits"). A manufacturer also has an incentive to protest inefficient retailer-induced price restraints
because they can harm its competitive position.
As a final matter, that a dominant manufacturer or retailer can abuse resale price
maintenance for anticompetitive purposes may not be a serious concern unless the
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relevant entity has market power. If a retailer lacks market power, manufacturers
likely can sell their goods through rival retailers. See also Business Electronics, supra,
at 727, n. 2, 108 S.Ct. 1515 (noting "[r]etail market power is rare, because of the usual
presence of interbrand competition and other dealers"). And if a manufacturer lacks
market power, there is less likelihood it can use the practice to keep competitors away
from distribution outlets.
The rule of reason is designed and used to eliminate anticompetitive transactions
from the market. This standard principle applies to vertical price restraints. A party
alleging injury from a vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices will have, as
a general matter, the information and resources available to show the existence of
the agreement and its scope of operation. As courts gain experience considering the
effects of these restraints by applying the rule of reason over the course of decisions,
they can establish the litigation structure to ensure the rule operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the market and to provide more guidance to businesses.
Courts can, for example, devise rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit
anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we think that were the Court considering the
issue as an original matter, the rule of reason, not a per se rule of unlawfulness, would
be the appropriate standard to judge vertical price restraints. ***
[In the omitted portion, the Court rejects the argument that stare decisis considerations require maintaining the Dr. Miles rule of per se illegality for vertical minimum
resale price maintenance.]
For these reasons the Court's decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376, 55 L.Ed. 502 (1911), is now overruled. Vertical
price restraints are to be judged according to the rule of reason. ***

NOTES
Note 6. As of the writing of this chapter, we are in uncertain territory with respect
to resale price maintenance. It was once conventional wisdom that practices adjudged
under the rule of reason were virtually per se legal, since courts made it very difficult
for plaintiffs to prove rule of reason violations. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 Geo. L.J. 305, 305 (1987) (asserting that "as a
practical matter [this] meant that [practices challenged under the rule of reason] were
declared lawful per se"); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic
Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1977) ("The
content of the Rule of Reason is largely unknown; in practice, it is little more than a
euphemism for nonliability:'). In recent years, however, courts have found for plaintiffs
in significant rule of reason cases. See, e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d
229 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding credit card companies' exclusionary by-law to be illegal
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under the rule of reason). Still, it is unclear how vigorously the rule of reason will be
applied in the post-Leegin world. Some early cases suggest that plaintiffs-including
franchisees-may still have a fair chance of winning vertical rule of reason cases. See,
e.g., Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 224-26 (3d
Cir. 2008) (reversing district court judgment in favor of franchisor and finding that
franchisee introduced sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that vertical restrictions
imposed by franchisor violated rule of reason because they supported a horizontal
cartel agreement by other dealers).
Note 7. Justice Kennedy's opinion discusses two scenarios in which resale price
maintenance could be anticompetitive-both of which involve potential horizontal
conspiracies. Does this suggest that, going forward, resale price maintenance claims
will be relevant only insofar as they help to establish a separate, horizontal antitrust
violation? If so, what are the implications of Leegin for franchising contracts?
Note 8. Justice Kennedy states that "in general, the interests of manufacturers and
consumers are aligned with respect to retailer profit margins:' Leegin, 551 U.S. at 879.
Do you understand why he says this, and do you agree? If Justice Kennedy is correct, is
there any circumstance in which resale price maintenance should be illegal, other than
the horizontal conspiracy possibilities suggested in the previous question (in which
the resale price maintenance is merely the tip of the iceberg)?

Problem 5.2
Yatzee Corp. is a Korean automobile manufacturer that has recently entered the U.S.
market as a low-price, low-service alternative to increasingly expensive Asian cars. It
enters into franchise agreements with dealers in the United States. Yatzee's standard
franchise agreement allows Yatzee to set the resale price of cars sold by its dealers.
Some of the dealers are unhappy with this arrangement and want to know whether the
resale price restrictions are illegal. What's your advice?

V.

Territorial and Customer Allocation

For a substantial portion of U.S. antitrust history, courts made a sharp distinction
between price and non-price vertical restraints. As you know from the preceding
section, until very recently it was per se illegal for a franchisor to restrict the prices
its franchisees could charge to their customers. In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the Supreme Court suggested that a similarly strict rule
might apply to manufacturer (or franchisor) non-price restrictions on retailers-such
as limitations on where (geographically) or to which customers the retailer could
make its sales. Unlike the pricing per se rules, the non-price per se rule survived for
only a decade.
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CONTINENTAL T. V. v. GTE SYLVANIA
433 U.S. 36 (1977)
Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Franchise agreements between manufacturers and retailers frequently include
provisions barring the retailers from selling franchised products from locations other
than those specified in the agreements. This case presents important questions concerning the appropriate antitrust analysis of these restrictions under § 1 of the Sherman Act,*** and the Court's decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365, 87 S. Ct. 1856, 18 L.Ed.2d 1249 (1967).

Respondent GTE Sylvania Inc. (Sylvania) manufactures and sells television sets
through its Home Entertainment Products Division. Prior to 1962, like most other television· manufacturers, Sylvania sold its televisions to independent or company-owned
distributors who in turn resold to a large and diverse group of retailers. Prompted by
a decline in its market share to a relatively insignificant 1% to 2% of national television
sales, *** Sylvania conducted an intensive reassessment of its marketing strategy, and
in 1962 adopted the franchise plan challenged here. Sylvania phased out its wholesale
distributors and began to sell its televisions directly to a smaller and more select group
of franchised retailers. An acknowledged purpose of the change was to decrease the
number of competing Sylvania retailers in the hope of attracting the more aggressive
and competent retailers thought necessary to the improvement of the company's
market position. *** To this end, Sylvania limited the number of franchises granted
for any given area and required each franchisee to sell his Sylvania products only from
the location or locations at which he was franchised. *** A franchise did not constitute
an exclusive territory, and Sylvania retained sole discretion to increase the number of
retailers in an area in light of the success or failure of existing retailers in developing
their market. The revised marketing strategy appears to have been successful during
the period at issue here, for by 1965 Sylvania's share of national television sales had
increased to approximately 5%, and the company ranked as the Nation's eighth largest
manufacturer of color television sets.
This suit is the result of the rupture of a franchiser-franchisee relationship that
had previously prospered under the revised Sylvania plan. Dissatisfied with its sales
in the city of San Francisco, *** Sylvania decided in the spring of 1965 to franchise
Young Brothers, an established San Francisco retailer of televisions, as an additional
San Francisco retailer. The proposed location of the new franchise was approximately
a mile from a retail outlet operated by petitioner Continental T. V., Inc. (Continental),
one of the most successful Sylvania franchisees. *** Continental protested that the
location of the new franchise violated Sylvania's marketing policy, but Sylvania per-
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sisted in its plans. Continental then canceled a large Sylvania order and placed a large
order with Phillips, one of Sylvania's competitors.
During this same period, Continental expressed a desire to open a store in Sacramento, Cal., a desire Sylvania attributed at least in part to Continental's displeasure
over the Young Brothers decision. Sylvania believed that the Sacramento market was
adequately served by the existing Sylvania retailers and denied the request. *** In the
face of this denial, Continental advised Sylvania in early September 1965, that it was
in the process of moving Sylvania merchandise from its San Jose, Cal., warehouse
to a new retail location that it had leased in Sacramento. Two weeks later, allegedly
for unrelated reasons, Sylvania's credit department reduced Continental's credit line
from $300,000 to $50,000. *** In response to the reduction in credit and the generally deteriorating relations with Sylvania, Continental withheld all payments owed to
John P. Maguire & Co., Inc. (Maguire), the finance company that handled the credit
arrangements between Sylvania and its retailers. Shortly thereafter, Sylvania terminated Continental's franchises, and Maguire filed this diversity action in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking recovery of money
owed and of secured merchandise held by Continental.
The antitrust issues before us originated in cross-claims brought by Continental
against Sylvania and Maguire. Most important for our purposes was the claim that
Sylvania had violated §1 of the Sherman Act by entering into and enforcing franchise
agreements that prohibited the sale of Sylvania products other than from specified
locations. *** At the close of evidence in the jury trial of Continental' s claims, Sylvania
requested the District Court to instruct the jury that its location restriction was illegal
only if it unreasonably restrained or suppressed competition. App. 5-6, 9-15. Relying
on this Court's decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., supra, the District
Court rejected the proffered instruction in favor of the following one:
"Therefore, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Sylvania entered into a
contract, combination, or conspiracywith one or more of its dealers pursuant to which
Sylvania exercised dominion or control over the products sold to the dealer, after having parted with title and risk to the products, you must find any effort thereafter to
restrict outlets or store locations from which its dealers resold the merchandise which
they had purchased from Sylvania to be a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
regardless of the reasonableness of the location restrictions:' App. 492.

In answers to special interrogatories, the jury found that Sylvania had engaged "in
a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust
laws with respect to location restrictions alone," and assessed Continental's damages
at $591,505, which was trebled pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15 to produce an award of
$1,774,515. App. 498, 501. ***
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed by
a divided vote. 537 F.2d 980 (1976). The court acknowledged that there is language in
Schwinn that could be read to support the District Court's instruction but concluded
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that Schwinn was distinguishable on several grounds. Contrasting the nature of the
restrictions, their competitive impact, and the market shares of the franchisers in the
two cases, the court concluded that Sylvania's location restriction had less potential
for competitive harm than the restrictions invalidated in Schwinn and thus should be
judged under the "rule of reason" rather than the per se rule stated in Schwinn. The
court found support for its position in the policies of the Sherman Act and in the decisions of other federal courts involving nonprice vertical restrictions. ***

II

A
We turn first to Continental's contention that Sylvania's restriction on retail
locations is a per se violation of§ 1 of the Sherman Act as interpreted in Schwinn. The
restrictions at issue in Schwinn were part of a three-tier distribution system comprising, in addition to Arnold, Schwinn & Co. (Schwinn), 22 intermediate distributors and
a network of franchised retailers. Each distributor had a defined geographic area in
which it had the exclusive right to supply franchised retailers. Sales to the public were
made only through franchised retailers, who were authorized to sell Schwinn bicycles
only from specified locations. In support of this limitation, Schwinn prohibited both
distributors and retailers from selling Schwinn bicycles to nonfranchised retailers. At
the retail level, therefore, Schwinn was able to control the number of retailers of its
bicycles in any given area according to its view of the needs of that market. ***
[The Court reviews the facts of Schwinn.]

8 ***
[In this section the Court concludes that Schwinn cannot be distinguished on its
facts.]

Ill
Sylvania argues that if Schwinn cannot be distinguished, it should be reconsidered. Although Schwinn is supported by the principle of stare decisis, *** we are convinced that the need for clarification of the law in this area justifies reconsideration.
Schwinn itself was an abrupt and largely unexplained departure from White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 83 S.Ct. 696, 9 L.Ed.2d 738 (1963), where only four
years earlier the Court had refused to endorse a per se rule for vertical restrictions.
Since its announcement, Schwinn has been the subject of continuing controversy and
confusion, both in the scholarly journals and in the federal courts. The great weight
of scholarly opinion has been critical of the decision, *** and a number of the federal
courts confronted with analogous vertical restrictions have sought to limit its reach.
*** In our view, the experience of the past 10 years should be brought to bear on this
subject of considerable commercial importance.
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The traditional framework of analysis under § 1 of the Sherman Act is familiar
and does not require extended discussion. Section 1 prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ... , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce." Since the early years
of this century a judicial gloss on this statutory language has established the "rule of
reason" as the prevailing standard of analysis. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911). Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of
the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition. *** Per se rules of illegality
are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive. As
the Court explained in Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5, 78 S.Ct. 514,
518, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958), "there are certain agreements or practices which because
of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as
to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."
In essence, the issue before us is whether Schwinn's per se rule can be justified under
the demanding standards of Northern Pac. R. Co. The Court's refusal to endorse a per se
rule in White Motor Co. was based on its uncertainty as to whether vertical restrictions
satisfied those standards. Addressing this question for the first time, the Court stated:
"We need to know more than we do about the actual impact of these arrangements on
competition to decide whether they have such a 'pernicious effect on competition and
lack ... any redeeming virtue' (Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, supra, 356 U.S. p.
5, 78 S.Ct. 514) and therefore should be classified as per se violations of the Sherman
Act:' 372 U.S., at 263, 83 S.Ct., at 702.

Only four years later the Court in Schwinn announced its sweeping per se rule without
even a reference to Northern Pac. R. Co. and with no explanation of its sudden change
in position. *** We turn now to consider Schwinn in light of Northern Pac. R. Co.
The market impact of vertical restrictions *** is complex because of their potential
for a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand
competition. 13 Significantly, the Court in Schwinn did not distinguish among the
13. [19) Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the
same generic product-television sets in this case-and is the primary concern of antitrust
law. The extreme example of a deficiency of interbrand competition is monopoly, where
there is only one manufacturer. In contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition
between the distributors-wholesale or retail-of the product of a particular manufacturer.
The degree of intrabrand competition is wholly independent of the level of interbrand
competition confronting the manufacturer. Thus, there may be fierce intrabrand competition among the distributors of a product produced by a monopolist and no intrabrand
competition among the distributors of a product produced by a firm in a highly competitive industry. But when interbrand competition exists, as it does among television manufacturers, it provides a significant check on the exploitation of intrabrand market power
because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different brand of the same product.
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challenged restrictions on the basis of their individual potential for intrabrand harm
or interbrand benefit. Restrictions that completely eliminated intrabrand competition
among Schwinn distributors were analyzed no differently from those that merely
moderated intrabrand competition among retailers. The pivotal factor was the passage of title: All restrictions were held to be per se illegal where title had passed, and
all were evaluated and sustained under the rule of reason where it had not. The location restriction at issue here would be subject to the same pattern of analysis under
Schwinn. 14
It appears that this distinction between sale and nonsale transactions resulted
from the Court's effort to accommodate the perceived intrabrand harm and interbrand benefit of vertical restrictions. The per se rule for sale transactions reflected the
view that vertical restrictions are "so obviously destructive" of intrabrand competition
that their use would "open the door to exclusivity of outlets and limitation of territory
further than prudence permits." *** 15 Conversely, the continued adherence to the
traditional rule of reason for nonsale transactions reflected the view that the restrictions have too great a potential for the promotion of interbrand competition to justify

14. In Schwinn, some of the sales of bicycles were from the manufacturer to distributors, who then resold to retailers. Other bicycle sales, though, were directly from the manufacturer to retailers. The latter were the transactions in which title had not passed. Those
were assessed under the rule of reason, whereas the ones in which title had passed triggered the per se rule.
15. [21) The Court also stated that to impose vertical restrictions in sale transactions
would "violate the ancient rule against restraints on alienation:' 388 U.S., at 380, 87 S.Ct.,
at 1866. The isolated reference has provoked sharp criticism from virtually all of the com mentators on the decision, most of whom have regarded the Court's apparent reliance on
the "ancient rule'' as both a misreading oflegal history and a perversion of antitrust analysis. *** We quite agree with Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting comment in Schwinn that "the
state of the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant to the issue before us: the
effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints in the American economy
today:'***
We are similarly unable to accept Judge Browning's interpretation of Schwinn. In
his dissent below he argued that the decision reflects the view that the Sherman Act was
intended to prohibit restrictions on the autonomy of independent businessmen even
though they have no impact on "price, quality, and quantity of goods and services:' 537
F.2d, at 1019. This view is certainly not explicit in Schwinn, which purports to be based on
an examination of the "impact (of the restrictions) upon the marketplace:'*** Competitive
economies have social and political as well as economic advantages, *** but an antitrust
policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks. ***
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complete prohibition. 16 The Court's opinion provides no analytical support for these
contrasting positions. Nor is there even an assertion in the opinion that the competitive impact of vertical restrictions is significantly affected by the form of the transaction. Non-sale transactions appear to be excluded from the per se rule, not because of
a greater danger of intrabrand harm or a greater promise of interbrand benefit, but
rather because of the Court's unexplained belief that a complete per se prohibition
would be too "inflexibl(e)." ***
Vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the number of
sellers of a particular product competing for the business of a given group of buyers.
Location restrictions have this effect because of practical constraints on the effective
marketing area of retail outlets. Although intrabrand competition may be reduced, the
ability of retailers to exploit the resulting market may be limited both by the ability of
consumers to travel to other franchised locations and, perhaps more importantly, to
purchase the competing products of other manufacturers. None of these key variables,
however, is affected by the form of the transaction by which a manufacturer conveys
his products to the retailers.
Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products. These "redeeming virtues" are implicit in every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule
of reason. Economists have identified a number of ways in which manufacturers can
use such restrictions to compete more effectively against other manufacturers. *** For
example, new manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the
restrictions in order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of
investment of capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products
unknown to the consumer. Established manufacturers can use them to induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their products. Service and repair are vital for many
products, such as automobiles and major household appliances. The availability and
quality of such services affect a manufacturer's goodwill and the competitiveness of
his product. Because of market imperfections such as the so-called "free rider" effect,
these services might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive situation,
16. [22] In that regard, the Court specifically stated that a more complete prohibition "might severely hamper smaller enterprises resorting to reasonable methods of meeting the competition of giants and of merchandising through independent dealers:' ***
The Court also broadly hinted that it would recognize additional exceptions to the per se
rule for new entrants in an industry and for failing firms, both of which were mentioned
in White Motor as candidates for such exceptions. *** The Court might have limited the
exceptions to the per se rule to these situations, which present the strongest arguments for
the sacrifice of intrabrand competition for interbrand competition. Significantly, it chose
instead to create the more extensive exception for nonsale transactions which is available
to all businesses, regardless of their size, financial health, or market share. This broader
exception demonstrates even more clearly the Court's awareness of the "redeeming virtues"
of vertical restrictions.
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despite the fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all provided the services
than if none did. ***
Economists also have argued that manufacturers have an economic interest in
maintaining as much intrabrand competition as is consistent with the efficient distribution of their products. *** 17 Although the view that the manufacturer's interest
necessarily corresponds with that of the public is not universally shared, even the
leading critic of vertical restrictions concedes that Schwinn's distinction between sale
and nonsale transactions is essentially unrelated to any relevant economic impact.
*** Indeed, to the extent that the form of the transaction is related ... to interbrand
benefits, the Court's distinction is inconsistent with its articulated concern for the
ability of smaller firms to compete effectively with larger ones. Capital requirements
and administrative expenses may prevent smaller firms from using the exception for
nonsale transactions. ***
We conclude that the distinction drawn in Schwinn between sale and nonsale
transactions is not sufficient to justify the application of a per se rule in one situation
and a rule of reason in the other. The question remains whether the per se rule stated in
Schwinn should be expanded to include non-sale transactions or abandoned in favor
of a return to the rule of reason. We have found no persuasive support for expanding
the per se rule. As noted above, the Schwinn Court recognized the undesirability of
"prohibit(ing) all vertical restrictions of territory and all franchising .... "*** And even
Continental does not urge us to hold that all such restrictions are per se illegal.
We revert to the standard articulated in Northern Pac. R. Co., and reiterated in
White Motor, for determining whether vertical restrictions must be "conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."*** Such restrictions, in varying forms, are widely used in our free market economy. As indicated
above, there is substantial scholarly and judicial authority supporting their economic
utility. There is relatively little authority to the contrary. *** Certainly, there has been
no showing in this case, either generally or with respect to Sylvania's agreements, that
vertical restrictions have or are likely to have a "pernicious effect on competition" or
that they "lack ... any redeeming virtue." Ibid. *** Accordingly, we conclude that the
per se rule stated in Schwinn must be overruled. *** In so holding we do not foreclose
the possibility that particular applications of vertical restrictions might justify per se
prohibition under Northern Pac. R. Co. But we do make clear that departure from the
rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather
than-as in Schwinn-upon formalistic line drawing.
17. [24] "Generally a manufacturer would prefer the lowest retail price possible, once
its price to dealers has been set, because a lower retail price means increased sales and
higher manufacturer revenues:' Note, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 636, 641 (1975). In this context, a
manufacturer is likely to view the difference between the price at which it sells to its retailers and their price to the consumer as his "cost of distribution;' which it would prefer to
minimize. ***
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In sum, we conclude that the appropriate decision is to return to the rule of reason
that governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn. When anticompetitive effects are
shown to result from particular vertical restrictions they can be adequately policed
under the rule of reason, the standard traditionally applied for the majority of anticompetitive practices challenged under § 1 of the Act. Accordingly, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is Affirmed.

NOTES
Note 9. A critical distinction made in Sylvania (which is also repeated in Leegin)
is between interbrand and intrabrand competition. Which does the Supreme Court
believe is more important to preserve, and how might certain kinds of non-price vertical restraints protect whichever kind is more important to protect?
Note 10. Why might a franchisor impose customer or territorial restrictions on
franchisees? Do you find the free-riding story persuasive?

VI.

Price Discrimination

Price discrimination refers to the practice of charging different prices to different
customers based on the customers' respective willingness to pay (what is known in
economic terms as the customers' respective demand elasticities). A more precise
economic definition is that price discrimination occurs "when two or more similar
goods are sold at prices that are in different ratios to marginal costs." Hal R. Varian,
Price Discrimination, in 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization 597, 598 (Richard
Schmalansee & Robert Willig eds., 1989). The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits certain
forms of price discrimination. It provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce *** to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities oflike grade and quality, *** where the
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them.

15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006).
The Act's prohibition on price discrimination is controversial-price discrimination can be efficient insofar as it leads to increases in output under certain circumstances. The Robinson-Patman Act's legislative history makes it apparent that
Congress was more interested in protecting small dealers than in promoting economic
efficiency-a policy orientation that does not sit well with antitrust law's current
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disposition toward efficiency. Recently, the bipartisan, Congressionally appointed
Antitrust Modernization Commission recommended repealing the Act altogether.
Repeal of the Act may be less salient in light of the recent Reeder-Simco decision (see
the case that follows), which arguably reads a competitive injury requirement into the
Act, thus aligning its jurisprudence with that of§ 2 of the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court has held that the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits two major
types or "lines" of price discrimination. "Primary line" price discrimination refers to
price discrimination that injures competition at the level of the firm giving the discriminatory price. Thus, for example, if a manufacturer gives retailers discriminatory
discounts to carry its products and thereby forecloses a competing manufacturer from
making sales, that would be a form of primary line price discrimination. The Supreme
Court has held that primary line price discrimination is functionally identical to predatory pricing under § 2 of the Sherman Act and requires proof of essentially the same
elements: that the defendant priced below "an appropriate measure of cost" and that
it has a "reasonable prospect" of recouping the costs of its below-cost pricing through
later supracompetitive (i.e., monopoly) pricing. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993).
"Secondary line" price discrimination refers to differential pricing that injures
competition at the level of the firm receiving the discount. This discrimination is the
subject of the Reeder-Simco case.

VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA v.
REEDER-SIMCO GMC
546 U.S. 164 (2006)
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns specially ordered products-heavy-duty trucks supplied by
Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. (Volvo), and sold by franchised dealers through
a competitive bidding process. In this process, the retail customer states its specifications and invites bids, generally from dealers franchised by different manufacturers.
Only when a Volvo dealer's bid proves successful does the dealer arrange to purchase
the trucks, which Volvo then builds to meet the customer's specifications.
Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. (Reeder), a Volvo dealer located in Fort Smith, Arkansas, commenced suit against Volvo alleging that Reeder's sales and profits declined
because Volvo offered other dealers more favorable price concessions than those
offered to Reeder. Reeder sought redress for its alleged losses under§ 2 of the Clayton
Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 49
Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (Robinson-Patman Act or Act), and the Arkansas Franchise
Practices Act, Ark.Code Ann. § 4-72-201 et seq. (2001). Reeder prevailed at trial and
on appeal on both claims.
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We granted review on the federal claim to resolve the question whether a manufacturer offering its dealers different wholesale prices may be held liable for price
discrimination proscribed by Robinson-Patman, absent a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers contemporaneously competing to resell to the
same retail customer. While state law designed to protect franchisees may provide,
and in this case has provided, a remedy for the dealer exposed to conduct of the kind
Reeder alleged, the Robinson-Patman Act, we hold, does not reach the case Reeder
presents. The Act centrally addresses price discrimination in cases involving competition between different purchasers for resale of the purchased product. Competition
of that character ordinarily is not involved when a product subject to special order is
sold through a customer-specific competitive bidding process.

Volvo manufactures heavy-duty trucks. Reeder sells new and used trucks, including heavy-duty trucks. *** Reeder became an authorized dealer of Volvo trucks in
1995, pursuant to a five-year franchise agreement that provided for automatic oneyear extensions if Reeder met sales objectives set by Volvo. *** Reeder generally sold
Volvo's trucks through a competitive bidding process. *** In this process, the retail
customer describes its specific product requirements and invites bids from several
dealers it selects. The customer's "decision to request a bid from a particular dealer or
to allow a particular dealer to bid is controlled by such factors as an existing relationship, geography, reputation, and cold calling or other marketing strategies initiated by
individual dealers." ***
Once a Volvo dealer receives the customer's specifications, it turns to Volvo and
requests a discount or "concession" off the wholesale price (set at 80% of the published
retail price). *** It is common practice in the industry for manufacturers to offer
customer-specific discounts to their dealers. *** Volvo decides on a case-by-case basis
whether to offer a discount and, if so, what the discount rate will be, taking account
of such factors as industry-wide demand and whether the retail customer has, historically, purchased a different brand of trucks. *** The dealer then uses the discount
offered by Volvo in preparing its bid; it purchases trucks from Volvo only if and when
the retail customer accepts its bid. ***
Reeder was one of many Volvo dealers, each assigned by Volvo to a geographic
territory. Reeder's territory encompassed ten counties in Arkansas and two in Oklahoma. *** Although nothing prohibits a Volvo dealer from bidding outside its territory, *** Reeder rarely bid against another Volvo dealer, ***. In the atypical event that
the same retail customer solicited a bid from more than one Volvo dealer, Volvo's
stated policy was to provide the same price concession to each dealer competing head
to head for the same sale. ***
In 1997, Volvo announced a program it called "Volvo Vision," in which the
company addressed problems it faced in the market for heavy trucks, among them,
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the company's assessment that it had too many dealers. Volvo projected enlarging the
size of its dealers' markets and reducing the number of dealers from 146 to 75. ***
Coincidentally, Reeder learned that Volvo had given another dealer a price concession
greater than the concessions Reeder typically received, and "Reeder came to suspect it
was one of the dealers Volvo sought to eliminate." *** Reeder filed suit against Volvo
in February 2000, alleging losses attributable to Volvo's violation of the Arkansas
Franchise Practices Act and the Robinson-Patman Act.
At trial, Reeder's vice-president, William E. Heck, acknowledged that Volvo's
policy was to offer equal concessions to Volvo dealers bidding against one another
for a particular contract, but he contended that the policy "was not executed." ***
Reeder presented evidence concerning two instances over the five-year course of its
authorized dealership when Reeder bid against other Volvo dealers for a particular
sale. *** One of the two instances involved Reeder's bid on a sale to Tommy Davidson Trucking. *** Volvo initially offered Reeder a concession of 17%, which Volvo,
unprompted, increased to 18.1 % and then, one week later, to 18.9%, to match the
concession Volvo had offered to another of its dealers. *** Neither dealer won the bid.
*** The other instance involved Hiland Dairy, which solicited bids from both Reeder
and Southwest Missouri Truck Center. *** Per its written policy, Volvo offered the
two dealers the same concession, and Hiland selected Southwest Missouri, a dealer
from which Hiland had previously purchased trucks. *** After selecting Southwest
Missouri, Hiland insisted on the price Southwest Missouri had bid prior to a general
increase in Volvo's prices; Volvo obliged by increasing the size of the discount. ***
Reeder dominantly relied on comparisons between concessions Volvo offered
when Reeder bid against non-Volvo dealers, with concessions accorded to other Volvo
dealers similarly bidding against non-Volvo dealers for other sales. Reeder's evidence
compared concessions Reeder received on four occasions when it bid successfully
against non-Volvo dealers (and thus purchased Volvo trucks), with more favorable
concessions other successful Volvo dealers received in connection with bidding processes in which Reeder did not participate. *** Reeder also compared concessions
offered by Volvo on several occasions when Reeder bid unsuccessfully against nonVolvo dealers (and therefore did not purchase Volvo trucks), with more favorable
concessions received by other Volvo dealers who gained contracts on which Reeder
did not bid. ***
Reeder's vice-president, Heck, testified that Reeder did not look for instances
in which it received a larger concession than another Volvo dealer, although he
acknowledged it was "quite possible" that such instances occurred.*** Nor did Reeder
endeavor to determine by any statistical analysis whether Reeder was disfavored on
average as compared to another dealer or set of dealers. ***
The jury found that there was a reasonable possibility that discriminatory pricing
may have harmed competition between Reeder and other Volvo truck dealers, and
that Volvo's discriminatory pricing injured Reeder.*** It further found that Reeder's
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damages from Volvo's Robinson-Patman Act violation exceeded $1.3 million.*** The
District Court summarily denied Volvo's motion for judgment as a matter of law and
the company's alternative motion for new trial or remittitur, awarded treble damages
on the Robinson-Patman Act claim, and entered judgment.***
We granted certiorari *** to resolve this question: May a manufacturer be held
liable for secondary-line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act in the
absence of a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers competing
to resell its product to the same retail customer? Satisfied that the Court of Appeals
erred in answering that question in the affirmative, we reverse the Eighth Circuit's
judgment.

II
Section 2, "when originally enacted as part of the Clayton Act in 1914, was born of
a desire by Congress to curb the use by financially powerful corporations of localized
price-cutting tactics which had gravely impaired the competitive position of other sellers."*** Augmenting that provision in 1936 with the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress
sought to target the perceived harm to competition occasioned by powerful buyers,
rather than sellers; specifically, Congress responded to the advent oflarge chainstores,
enterprises with the clout to obtain lower prices for goods than smaller buyers could
demand.***
Mindful of the purposes of the Act and of the antitrust laws generally, we have
explained that Robinson-Patman does not "ban all price differences charged to different purchasers of commodities oflike grade and quality," Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,220, 113 S.Ct. 2578, 125 L.Ed.2d 168 (1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted); rather, the Act proscribes "price discrimination
only to the extent that it threatens to injure competition," ibid. Our decisions describe
three categories of competitive injury that may give rise to a Robinson-Patman Act
claim: primary-line, secondary-line, and tertiary-line. Primary-line cases entail conduct-most conspicuously, predatory pricing-that injures competition at the level of
the discriminating seller and its direct competitors. *** Secondary-line cases, of which
this is one, involve price discrimination that injures competition among the discriminating seller's customers (here, Volvo's dealerships); cases in this category typically
refer to "favored" and "disfavored" purchasers. See ibid.; Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck,
496 U.S. 543, 558, n. 15, 110 S.Ct. 2535, 110 L.Ed.2d 492 (1990). Tertiary-line cases
involve injury to competition at the level of the purchaser's customers. See Areeda
<J[ 601e, p. 907.
To establish the secondary-line injury of which it complains, Reeder had to show
that (1) the relevant Volvo truck sales were made in interstate commerce; (2) the trucks
were of "like grade and quality"; (3) Volvo "discriminate[d] in price between" Reeder
and another purchaser of Volvo trucks; and (4) "the effect of such discrimination may be
... to injure, destroy, or prevent competition" to the advantage of a favored purchaser,
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i.e., one who "receive[d) the benefit of such discrimination." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). It is
undisputed that Reeder has satisfied the first and second requirements. Volvo and the
United States, as amicus curiae, maintain that Reeder cannot satisfy the third and fourth
requirements, because Reeder has not identified any differentially-priced transaction
in which it was both a "purchaser" under the Act and "in actual competition" with a
favored purchaser for the same customer.
A hallmark of the requisite competitive injury, our decisions indicate, is the
diversion of sales or profits from a disfavored purchaser to a favored purchaser. ***
We have also recognized that a permissible inference of competitive injury may arise
from evidence that a favored competitor received a significant price reduction over
a substantial period of time. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 49-51, 68 S.Ct.
822, 92 L.Ed. 1196 (1948); Falls City Industries, 460 U.S., at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1282. Absent
actual competition with a favored Volvo dealer, however, Reeder cannot establish the
competitive injury required under the Act.

Ill
The evidence Reeder offered at trial falls into three categories: ( 1) comparisons
of concessions Reeder received for four successful bids against non-Volvo dealers,
with larger concessions other successful Volvo dealers received for different sales on
which Reeder did not bid (purchase-to-purchase comparisons); (2) comparisons of
concessions offered to Reeder in connection with several unsuccessful bids against
non-Volvo dealers, with greater concessions accorded other Volvo dealers who competed successfully for different sales on which Reeder did not bid (offer-to-purchase
comparisons); and (3) evidence of two occasions on which Reeder bid against another
Volvo dealer (head-to-head comparisons). The Court of Appeals concluded that
Reeder demonstrated competitive injury under the Act because Reeder competed with
favored purchasers "at the same functional level ... and within the same geographic
market." *** As we see it, however, selective comparisons of the kind Reeder presented
do not show the injury to competition targeted by the Robinson-Patman Act.

A
Both the purchase-to-purchase and the offer-to-purchase comparisons fall short,
for in none of the discrete instances on which Reeder relied did Reeder compete with
beneficiaries of the alleged discrimination for the same customer. Nor did Reeder
even attempt to show that the compared dealers were consistently favored vis-a-vis
Reeder. Reeder simply paired occasions on which it competed with non-Volvo dealers
for a sale to Customer A with instances in which other Volvo dealers competed with
non-Volvo dealers for a sale to Customer B. The compared incidents were tied to no
systematic study and were separated in time by as many as seven months. ***
We decline to permit an inference of competitive injury from evidence of such
a mix-and-match, manipulable quality. *** No similar risk of manipulation occurs

Antitrust Principles Affecting Franchise Law

235

in cases kin to the chain-store paradigm. Here, there is no discrete "favored" dealer
comparable to a chain store or a large independent department store-at least, Reeder's evidence is insufficient to support an inference of such a dealer or set of dealers.
For all we know, Reeder, on occasion, might have gotten a better deal vis-a-vis one or
more of the dealers in its comparisons. ***
Reeder may have competed with other Volvo dealers for the opportunity to bid on
potential sales in a broad geographic area. At that initial stage, however, competition
is not affected by differential pricing; a dealer in the competitive bidding process here
at issue approaches Volvo for a price concession only after it has been selected by a
retail customer to submit a bid. Competition for an opportunity to bid, we earlier
observed, is based on a variety of factors, including the existence vel non of a relationship between the potential bidder and the customer, geography, and reputation. ***
We reiterate in this regard an observation made by Judge Hansen, dissenting from
the Eighth Circuit's Robinson-Patman holding: Once a retail customer has chosen
the particular dealers from which it will solicit bids, "the relevant market becomes
limited to the needs and demands of a particular end user, with only a handful of
dealers competing for the ultimate sale."*** That Volvo dealers may bid for sales in
the same geographic area does not import that they in fact competed for the same
customer-tailored sales. In sum, the purchase-to-purchase and offer-to-purchase
comparisons fail to show that Volvo sold at a lower price to Reeder's "competitors,"
hence those comparisons do not support an inference of competitive injury. ***

8
Reeder did offer evidence of two instances in which it competed head to head
with another Volvo dealer. *** When multiple dealers bid for the business of the same
customer, only one dealer will win the business and thereafter purchase the supplier's
product to fulfill its contractual commitment. Because Robinson-Patman "prohibits
only discrimination 'between different purchasers,"'*** Volvo and the United States
argue, the Act does not reach markets characterized by competitive bidding and
special-order sales, as opposed to sales from inventory. *** We need not decide that
question today. Assuming the Act applies to the head-to-head transactions, Reeder did
not establish that it was disfavored vis-a-vis other Volvo dealers in the rare instances
in which they competed for the same sale-let alone that the alleged discrimination
was substantial. ***
Reeder's evidence showed loss of only one sale to another Volvo dealer, a sale of
12 trucks that would have generated $30,000 in gross profits for Reeder.... Per its
policy, Volvo initially offered Reeder and the other dealer the same concession. Volvo
ultimately granted a larger concession to the other dealer, but only after it had won
the bid. In the only other instance of head-to-head competition Reeder identified,
Volvo increased Reeder's initial 17% discount to 18.9%, to match the discount offered
to the other competing Volvo dealer; neither dealer won the bid. *** In short, if price
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discrimination between two purchasers existed at all, it was not of such magnitude as
to affect substantially competition between Reeder and the "favored" Volvo dealer.

IV
Interbrand competition, our opinions affirm, is the "primary concern of antitrust
law." Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., ***. The Robinson-Patman Act
signals no large departure from that main concern. Even if the Act's text could be
construed in the manner urged by Reeder and embraced by the Court of Appeals, we
would resist interpretation geared more to the protection of existing competitors than
to the stimulation of competition. *** In the case before us, there is no evidence that
any favored purchaser possesses market power, the allegedly favored purchasers are
dealers with little resemblance to large independent department stores or chain operations, and the supplier's selective price discounting fosters competition among suppliers of different brands. *** By declining to extend Robinson-Patman's governance
to such cases, we continue to construe the Act "consistently with broader policies of
the antitrust laws."***

NOTES
Note 11. One issue that sometimes arises in Robinson-Patman cases is how to

handle bulk discounts. Formally, there may seem to be nothing discriminatory about
giving a lower price to a customer who buys more, so long as the same bulk discount
offer is made to every customer. Functionally, though, it may turn out that only the
largest customers are able to qualify for the bulk discount, such that the bulk discount
program ends up amounting to a discriminatory discount to large customers. And
so the Supreme Court held in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). But then a
further issue arises: What if the reason for the bulk discount is that it is cheaper for the
manufacturer to sell in bulk? The Robinson-Patman Act provides for a cost-savings
defense, but in Morton Salt the Court required a strict showing that the amount of
the cost savings and the amount of the bulk discount were proportional. A franchisor
who offers bulk discounts to its franchisees would thus be well advised to document
the extent to which the bulk discounts are cost justified, and not exceed its cost savings
in offering the discounts.
Note 12. Justice Ginsburg's opinion states that she "would resist interpretation

geared more to the protection of existing competitors than to the stimulation of competition:' Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc., 546 U.S. at 168. The Supreme Court often makes
this distinction between the interests of individual competitors and the integrity of
the competitive process. Explain the distinction in your own words, and analyze why
Reeder showed harm to itself but not to competition.

